

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 21 1956

# Bulletin

Vol. XXXV, No. 906

November 5, 1956

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# Bulletin

VOL. XXXV, No. 906 • PUBLICATION 6411

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25  
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been  
approved by the Director of the Bureau of  
the Budget (January 19, 1955).

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## The Task of Waging Peace

*Address by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

I recall being here almost exactly 4 years ago. A few days afterward I was Secretary of State-designate, and ever since then I have been quite busy. I am glad, however, to have found it possible to return here to Dallas and to join your World Affairs Council as it celebrates its fifth anniversary.

When I was here before, we talked about some of the problems ahead of us. I suggest that we do the same tonight, looking first at the significance of some broad principles. These are not partisan principles. Indeed, they are largely the outgrowth of nonpartisan consultations between the Executive and the Congress.

Then I shall speak of the Suez Canal problem. It is an unfinished drama of suspense which illustrates the kind of effort, often called "waging peace," which will be required, day in and day out, for many years, in many matters, as we seek a just and durable peace.

### Maintaining Military Power

Let me speak first of our military strength. That we must have. For moral strength alone is not enough. If we were relatively feeble in relation to the vast military power possessed by unscrupulous men, then we would not be the master of our own destiny.

But, while it is simple to decide to be militarily strong, it is difficult to decide in what way to be strong. There are many ways—air, army, navy—conventional and atomic weapons—defense and offense. We cannot be equally strong in all ways and at all times and at all places without assuming an intolerable load.

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Dallas Council on World Affairs, Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 27 (press release 560).

Fortunately, it is not necessary for the United States alone to possess all of the military power needed to balance that of the Soviet bloc. We have allies, and they contribute to the common defense. But we do have one special responsibility. We alone have the economic and financial strength and the "know-how" to prevent the world from being dominated by the atomic and nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union is feverishly developing. We must possess a capacity to retaliate on a scale which is sufficient to deter aggression. We must have that capacity, not in the expectation of having to *use* it but because if we have that capacity we shall probably *never* have to use it.

But there may be local aggressions, so-called "nibblings," not initially involving the most potent weapons. We and our allies should, between us, have the capacity to deal with these without our action producing a general nuclear war. Furthermore, it would be reckless to risk everything on one form of armament, because no one can forecast with certainty the requirements of a future war.

Thus, we and our allies, in addition to having great nuclear power, should have conventional forces which can help to defend the free world. The combined free-world military strength must be sufficiently balanced, sufficiently flexible, and so deployed that it can deter or defeat both big and little aggressions.

Of course, peace which rests upon the deterrent effect of military power is not an ideal peace. There ought to be a controlled limitation of armament. To achieve that is perhaps the most difficult of all tasks of peace. But if the difficulties are great, so also is the necessity to overcome those

difficulties. Let our action reflect faith that what needs to be done can be done.

### **Strengthening Collective Security**

I turn now to a second major area of concern. That is the maintaining and strengthening of our collective-security arrangements.

The United States now has collective-security associations with 42 other nations. The principal charters are the Rio Pact of the American Republics, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Southeast Asia Treaty.

All of these arrangements, in their present form, are the product of a sense of danger born of the aggressive and violent foreign policies of power-hungry dictators—firstly Hitler and then the Soviet and Chinese Communist rulers.

But now that sense of danger is somewhat dissipated. The Soviet Union has continued intensively its efforts to develop military supremacy. But it has also sought—at least until this week—to appear more peace-loving. In consequence, rightly or wrongly, it became widely felt that there was less danger of general war. The cement of fear is not so strong to *hold* us together as it was to *bring* us together.

That is not logical, because the basic danger persists—vast military power in the hands of a dictatorship unrestrained by moral principles. We should, therefore, hold fast that which has made us more safe. But we cannot get away from the fact that, as people feel less endangered, they tend to draw apart—unless they find a basis for unity which transcends that sense of danger.

That is perhaps most readily achieved in the case of the Organization of American States. That association has a rich and venerable background. It is designed not merely to repel external aggression but to solve controversies among the American nations themselves. At the recent Panama meeting it was agreed that more emphasis should be put upon economic and cultural relations. This concept is being actively developed.

We face the same problem in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Its members are now studying how to develop its nonmilitary aspects. Senator Walter George is acting for the United States in relation to this matter and bringing his great experience and talents to bear upon it.

In the case of our Pacific and Asian associations the problem is somewhat different because the Chinese Communists keep fear alive. They con-

tinue to threaten the Republics of Korea and Vietnam with military force. They periodically threaten to take Taiwan (Formosa) by force. They have occupied portions of Burma with armed force.

In the Far East danger is still apparent, although even there the Chinese Communists occasionally seek to woo with blandishments. So, even there we cannot rely on the cement of fear alone. To find sounder ties will be one of the tasks of the Foreign Ministers of the SEATO countries when they meet next spring.

We do not, of course, forget the United Nations. It was designed to provide collective security for all and increased economic and social fellowship. The United Nations has performed and is performing a great service in these respects. But it still falls short of what it could be. The strengthening of the United Nations is another vital phase of the collective effort to build peace and justice in the world.

### **Newly Independent Nations**

A third major area of concern relates to the nearly 700 million people who, in 18 new nations, have achieved full independence since World War II. These new nations are distinctive in many respects. But they are alike in being imbued with national patriotism that won them their freedom. Also they are all inspired by a vision of progress toward well-being.

Some of these newly independent nations realize that their independence can best be assured through such collective-security arrangements as we have described. We are proud to be associated with these nations and are determined to justify their confidence.

Other newly independent nations prefer not to adhere to collective-security pacts. We acknowledge, of course, their freedom of choice.

We have a deep interest in the independence of all of these new nations and stand ready to contribute, from our store of skills and resources, to help them achieve a solid economic foundation for their freedom.

This is a challenging problem for the free world. For, in the long run, political independence and economic well-being are interdependent. Much has been done, and is being done, to meet the problem. But it is on a piecemeal basis. The search for adequate and dependable processes is still unfinished business.

Surely it is within the capability of the free world to assure that no people dedicated to freedom have to choose between Communist serfdom and economic destitution.

#### Captive Nations

Another intensive concern of our foreign policy is in relation to the captive nations of the world. We had looked upon World War II as a war of liberation. The Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration committed all the Allies to restore sovereign rights and self-government to those who had been forcibly deprived of them and to recognize the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live. Unhappily, those pledges have been violated, and in Eastern Europe one form of conquest was merely replaced by another.

But the spirit of patriotism, and the longing of individuals for freedom of thought and of conscience and the right to mold their own lives, are forces which erode and finally break the iron bonds of servitude.

Today we see dramatic evidence of this truth. The Polish people now loosen the Soviet grip upon the land they love. And the heroic people of Hungary challenge the murderous fire of Red Army tanks. These patriots value liberty more than life itself. And all who peacefully enjoy liberty have a solemn duty to seek, by all truly helpful means, that those who now die for freedom will not have died in vain. It is in this spirit that the United States and others have today acted to bring the situation in Hungary to the United Nations Security Council.

The weakness of Soviet imperialism is being made manifest. Its weakness is not military weakness nor lack of material power. It is weak because it seeks to sustain an unnatural tyranny by suppressing human aspirations which cannot indefinitely be suppressed and by concealing truths which cannot indefinitely be hidden.

Imperialist dictatorships often present a formidable exterior. For a time they may seem to be hard, glittering, and irresistible. But in reality they turn out to be "like unto whitened sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness." They have vulnerabilities not easily seen.

Our Nation has from its beginning stimulated political independence and human liberty

throughout the world. Lincoln said of our Declaration of Independence that it gave "liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time." During the period when our Nation was founded, the tides of despotism were running high. But our free society and its good fruits became known throughout the world and helped to inspire the subject peoples of that day to demand, and to get, the opportunity to mold their own destinies.

Today our Nation continues its historic role. The captive peoples should never have reason to doubt that they have in us a sincere and dedicated friend who shares their aspirations. They must know that they can draw upon our abundance to tide themselves over the period of economic adjustment which is inevitable as they rededicate their productive efforts to the service of their own people, rather than of exploiting masters. Nor do we condition economic ties between us upon the adoption by these countries of any particular form of society.

And let me make this clear, beyond a possibility of doubt: The United States has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries. Our unadulterated wish is that these peoples, from whom so much of our own national life derives, should have sovereignty restored to them and that they should have governments of their own free choosing. We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies. We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer divided Europe. We are confident that their independence, if promptly accorded, will contribute immensely to stabilize peace throughout all of Europe, West and East.

#### Peoples of U.S.S.R.

Let me add a word about future relations with the peoples who compose the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. They, too, can have hope. The spread of education and industrial development create growing demands for greater intellectual and spiritual freedom, for greater personal security through the protection of law, and for greater enjoyment of the good things of life. And there has been some response to those demands.

There is ground to believe that that trend will prove to be an irreversible trend. It may bring the day when the people of the United States can have, with the people of Russia, the relations of fellowship which they would like and when the

Governments of our countries can deal with each other as friends.

#### **Suez Canal Controversy**

I have spoken in terms of the general. But also there is the particular. A world which vitally reflects human passions and imperfections will constantly produce particular situations which endanger the peace or good relations between nations. History records a long succession of such situations; there are several now, and there will be more to come. I shall speak briefly of one—the Suez Canal controversy. I pick that because it is of great immediate importance and because it illustrates the ever-present task of "waging peace."

The Suez Canal is the world's most important manmade waterway. It is made international by treaty. Since it was opened 90 years ago, it has been operated by the Universal Suez Canal Company. On July 26, 1956, the Egyptian Government, for national purposes, seized that company and took over the canal operations.

The Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, and the United States quickly met to consider what should be done. Some people thought that force should at once be employed to restore the situation that Egypt had disturbed. But our three Governments agreed to call together, in conference, the 24 nations most directly involved, including Egypt.

That was "Peace Effort No. 1."

The conference was held in London in August. Only two of those invited, including Egypt, failed to attend. At that conference 18 nations of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and America, representing over 90 percent of the canal traffic, formulated a proposal to assure efficient and dependable operation, maintenance, and development of the canal as called for by the Convention of 1888.

This London conference was "Peace Effort No. 2."

Then the 18 nations which had agreed to the proposal I mention sent a 5-nation mission to Cairo, headed by Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, to lay their suggestion before President Nasser.

That mission to Cairo was "Peace Effort No. 3."

When President Nasser rejected the proposal, the 18 nations met again at London in September. There they formulated a plan to create a cooperative association to represent the interest of the canal users. It was hoped that the association might develop, on a provisional, practical, operat-

ing basis, an acceptable measure of cooperation with the Egyptian canal authorities.

This September conference was "Peace Effort No. 4."

While the Users Association was in process of organization, the United Kingdom and France brought the Suez problem to the United Nations Security Council. After being in session for 9 days, the Council adopted six principles which should govern the Suez solution.<sup>2</sup> These six principles were substantially those which had been adopted by the 18 user nations when they met in London last August.

France and the United Kingdom also proposed measures to advance the implementation of these principles. That portion of the resolution received 9 of 11 votes, but it failed of adoption because of a Soviet Union veto.

That Security Council proceeding was "Peace Effort No. 5."

While the formal proceedings of the Security Council were taking place, informal and private exchanges of views were being held by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

These private and informal talks were "Peace Effort No. 6."

It is now hoped that further exchanges of views will be resumed between the three Governments mentioned. These meetings, if they occur, would constitute "Peace Effort No. 7."

I trust that this recital has not been tedious. I can assure you that the efforts themselves, while they have been exacting, have not been tedious for the many people from many lands who have thus sought to secure a peaceful and just settlement of the situation resulting from the seizure, by the Egyptian Government, of an instrumentality of vital international significance.

Under the international conditions which prevailed prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter, we would almost surely have had war before now. The future is still obscure. But 3 months have been devoted to almost continuous efforts to bring about a settlement by agreement. Peace has been waged with intensity and imagination. The next stage, which may be decisive, depends primarily on the three Governments most

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1956, p. 616.

directly involved—France, the United Kingdom, and Egypt—with the Secretary-General of the United Nations playing an important role.

It seemed to us from the beginning that any solution should take account of two basic facts. One is that an international waterway like the Suez Canal, which has always had an international status, cannot properly be made an instrumentality of any government's national policies so that equal passage may depend on that government's favor. That does not require Egypt to forgo the rights which are normal to it as the sovereign nation through whose territory this international waterway passes. It does mean that Egypt should not be in a position to exercise such arbitrary power, open or devious, over the operations of this international waterway that the nations dependent on the canal will in effect be living under an economic "sword of Damocles." That would be an intolerable state of affairs. It would be inconsistent with the United Nations Charter requirement that these situations must be dealt with in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

The second basic proposition is that economic interdependence between Europe, Asia, and Africa, such as is served so indispensably by the Suez Canal, cannot be made truly secure by coercion and force.

If implementation of these two principles is sought in good spirit, there can be a negotiated conclusion.

I cannot predict the outcome. The situation is grave. There are complicating and disturbing factors unrelated to the canal itself. But if the Governments most directly concerned—those of Britain, France, and Egypt—with help from the United Nations, do come to agree, they will have written an inspiring new chapter in the agelong struggle to find a just and durable peace. They will deserve the praise which world opinion and history will surely bestow upon them.

#### **Maintaining the Peace**

What we have said about the Suez Canal problem perhaps makes clear that none of the general policies which have been outlined during the first portion of my talk can be translated into reality without encountering and overcoming a multiplicity of specific obstacles.

We all know the obstacles which men face and

surmount, in time of war, to secure victory. It seems not to be realized that it is necessary to make comparable efforts, in time of peace, to preserve peace. Peace will never be won so long as men reserve for war their finest effort. Peace has to be waged, just as war has to be waged, and men and nations have to work intensively and sacrificially to overcome the threats to peace and justice.

I see no reason why that should not be done. Surely peace is a goal which deserves to be sought with the same dedication that would be devoted in war to winning victory. Today it is the more important because we now live in a world where, if war comes, there may be no victors.

I am confident that the mood I describe is that of our people and of our political leaders, without regard to party. If that mood be matched by the people and leaders of other lands, then we can see the future as one which, despite its vast perplexities, beckons us hopefully to great tasks of creation.

#### **Increased Tensions in Middle East**

#### **STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER**

White House press release dated October 28

During the last several days I have received disturbing reports from the Middle East. These included information that Israel was making a heavy mobilization of its armed forces. These reports became so well authenticated that yesterday morning, after a meeting with the Secretary of State, I sent a personal message to the Prime Minister of Israel expressing my grave concern and renewing a previous recommendation that no forcible initiative be taken which would endanger the peace.

I have just received additional reports which indicate that the Israeli mobilization has continued and has become almost complete, with consequent stoppage of many civil activities. The gravity of the situation is such that I am dispatching a further urgent message to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.

I have given instructions that these developments be discussed with the United Kingdom and

France, which joined with the United States in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950,<sup>1</sup> with respect to the maintenance of peace in the Middle East.

While we have not heard of such large-scale mobilization in countries neighboring Israel which would warrant such Israeli mobilization, I have also directed that my concern over the present situation be communicated to other Middle East states, urgently requesting that they refrain from any action which could lead to hostilities.

The Security Council of the United Nations now has before it various aspects of the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. I earnestly hope that none of the nations involved will take any action that will hinder the Council in its efforts to achieve a peaceful solution.

#### **DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING AMERICANS IN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES**

Press release 563 dated October 28

The President in his statement today drew attention to increased tensions in the Middle East and indicated steps which this Government is taking to ameliorate the situation and prevent hostilities in that area.

The United States earnestly hopes that a high order of statesmanship will be shown by the governments involved, and that the peace will not be violated. As a matter of prudence, however, measures are being instituted to reduce the numbers of Americans, particularly dependents, in several of the Middle Eastern countries. While it is not contemplated that a full-scale evacuation will take place, persons who are not performing essential functions will be asked to depart until conditions improve.

The Department of State urges American citizens planning to visit countries in the Middle East to defer such plans until the situation is clearer.

In announcing these measures, the Department emphasizes their precautionary nature and is confident that the governments of the several countries will, in any circumstances which might arise, afford full protection to American lives and property in accordance with their responsibility under international law.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 834, footnote.

#### **U.S. CONCERN FOR HUNGARIAN PEOPLE**

*Following are texts of statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles concerning developments in Hungary, together with an account of a conversation between Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and the First Secretary of the Hungarian Legation.*

#### **STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT**

White House press release dated October 25

The United States considers the development in Hungary as being a renewed expression of the intense desire for freedom long held by the Hungarian people. The demands reportedly made by the students and the working people clearly fall within the framework of those human rights to which all are entitled, which are affirmed in the charter of the United Nations, and which are specifically guaranteed to the Hungarian people by the treaty of peace to which the Governments of Hungary and of the Allied and Associated Powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States, are parties.

The United States deplores the intervention of Soviet military forces which, under the treaty of peace, should have been withdrawn and the presence of which in Hungary, as is now demonstrated, is not to protect Hungary against armed aggression from without but rather to continue an occupation of Hungary by the forces of an alien government for its own purposes.

The heart of America goes out to the people of Hungary.

#### **STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES**

Press release 562 dated October 28

The Government of the United States is actively concerned with the suffering caused the Hungarian people by the street fighting and military operations in Hungary. It has been in constant touch with the American Red Cross authorities. The American Red Cross has offered assistance through the International Red Cross in Geneva, Switzerland, and this Government has offered to extend assistance to alleviate suffering on the part of the Hungarian people. It will continue to

pursue this matter vigorously. It is understood that the Red Cross societies of 30 countries have made offers of assistance.

#### **CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. MURPHY AND MR. ZÁDOR**

*On October 27 Lincoln White, Acting Chief of the News Division, made the following statement to correspondents.*

At the request of the Department of State, the First Secretary of the Hungarian Legation, Tibor Zádor, was asked to come in to see Deputy Under Secretary Murphy today. Mr. Murphy told him that, since our Legation is cut off from contact with Washington, we are eager to get information about conditions in Hungary. Mr. Zádor said that he had been in communication with his Legation in London, which has radio communications with Budapest. He said that the Legation in London had confirmed that the new government had been established.

Mr. Murphy cited reports of fighting and the intervention by Soviet military forces, and Mr. Zádor said this was true and referred to a "riot" in Budapest. He had no information about the

provinces. He said the fighting started after student demonstrations. The students had demanded certain changes, which, he said, had been made. He said that the students were justified in these demands but that "Fascists" had taken advantage of the situation. Mr. Murphy asked whether the workers had made the same demands. Mr. Zádor said that they had.

Mr. Murphy asked whether Hungary welcomed the intervention by Soviet forces, citing reports of the number of Hungarians who had been killed by these forces. The First Secretary said that this was quite legal under the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Zádor was told by Mr. Murphy that we had been in touch with the American Red Cross and that 15 national Red Cross societies, including that of the United States, had made offers of assistance through the International Red Cross but that the League at Geneva had not been able to contact the Hungarian Government. Mr. Murphy stressed that we were very much interested in the humanitarian aspects of the situation and hoped that something could be done to alleviate the suffering of the Hungarian people.

Mr. Murphy closed the conversation by lodging a firm protest about the fact that our diplomatic representative in Hungary is completely cut off from communications with his Government.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Later the same day Mr. White read to correspondents the following message which had been transmitted to the Department on behalf of the U.S. Legation in Budapest by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry: "This short clear [not coded] message sent through facilities of Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Situation report 1400 hours 27th all communications have been closed down 5th a.m., Thursday [Oct. 25]. We have understood however that Washington was kept abreast on broad outline of situation here from news report and certain other sources. No incident in Legation area since massive demonstration 1700 hours 25th. Szechenyi apartment area saw heavy firing Thursday morning with considerable damage to apartments. Most American personnel spent night 25th in the basement of the apartment house and were evacuated to the Legation shortly before noon of the next day.

"U.S. citizens Mr. and Mrs. Chrysler [Bernard Kreisler], Mr. and Mrs. Mathys and Mr. Wolf departed for Vienna with convoy of other nationals 26th. Four U.S. citizens of the Garst Group [representatives of the Garst and

Thomas Hybrid Corn Co., Coon Rapids, Iowa] still in Margit Island Hotel. All American personnel and dependents unharmed as of 1400 hours 27th. Also Mrs. Diana Hgirtaaf of Norway who would appreciate notification family through Norwegian Embassy.

"Government radio has announced that groups of three or more persons will be fired on and that all individuals are confined to houses after 1000 hours 27th. Legation personnel have been advised by Hungarian Foreign Office that while curfew does not apply to diplomatic personnel they would advise that streets were unsafe and should not be used by any member foreign mission."

The reference to "5th a. m." in the second sentence of the message presumably means "5 p. m." since the Department had received a communication sent by the Legation the afternoon of the 25th. Asked about the phrase "certain other sources" in the third sentence, Mr. White told correspondents that news reports had been the only source of information since the cutting off of communications.

## Communist Imperialism in the Satellite World

*Remarks by President Eisenhower:*

Here we commemorate the establishment of an organization created to further a great American purpose. For individual freedom, rooted in human dignity and in human responsibility, is a theme that runs through the whole story of American labor. And, certainly, it is significant that the First Continental Congress met in Philadelphia's Carpenters' Hall in 1774 and, in that same hall, the Constitutional Convention assembled 13 years later.

Freedom is not restricted to the fundamental rights of which we so often speak, including freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly. Your forebears in the labor movement recognized that the industrial revolution had created new problems, requiring a new approach by worker and employer alike—an approach that stressed the equal dignity, the equal responsibility of labor and management.

Consequently, your Brotherhood stands for: freedom to organize, freedom to bargain, freedom to strike. Above all, freedom to vote with complete independence—that was one of the first resolutions, I am told, your Brotherhood called for 75 years ago. In standing for those things, you help extend the boundaries of human freedom and amplify our concept of them.

Others, men like Marx and Lenin, saw in a far different light and setting the new problems created by the industrial revolution. And they came up with a completely different answer, substituting for free labor and free management the omnipotent state.

<sup>2</sup> Made before the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America at Washington, D. C., on Oct. 23 (White House press release).

The industrialized world is now divided between those who follow the philosophy of freedom and those whose lives are regimented under the philosophy of communism.

### Unrest in the Satellite World

I should like to talk to you briefly on the fruits of communistic imperialism, now daily becoming evident in the satellite world. Let us take one country as an example.

The Poles, as a people, have known freedom.

For that matter, in the persons of Kosciuszko, and Pulaski, and countless others, they were builders of American freedom. And, by the hundreds of thousands, they helped build industrial America and the free labor movement.

But, for 17 years now, they have been victims of two tyrannies in succession. Neither tolerated freedom. And the Polish people rebelled against both, for the love of freedom was and is the strongest mark of the Polish character.

A people like the Poles who have once known freedom cannot be for always deprived of their national independence and of their personal liberty. That truth applies to every people in Eastern Europe who have enjoyed independence and freedom.

For a time, that truth may be obscured. Tyranny can, for a while, effectively present a false facade of material accomplishment. But that illusion is no substitute for the freedom that men and women cherish from raising their children in family loyalty—choosing their jobs or their friends and associates—practicing their religious faith without fear.

Eventually, as in the satellites today, the cost proves greater to a once proud and independent

people than the value of the monuments or factories—or prisons—that have been erected.

In those lands, the fruits of imperialism are discontent, unrest, riots in one place and demonstrations in another, until the tyranny exercised over them either dissolves or is expelled.

The day of liberation may be postponed where armed forces for a time make protest suicidal. But all history testifies that the memory of freedom is not erased by the fear of guns and the love of freedom is more enduring than the power of tyrants. But it is necessary that the inspiration of freedom and the benefits enjoyed by those who possess it are known to those oppressed.

#### **The Mission of the United States**

We, as a nation—in that light—have a job to do, a mission as the champion of human freedom. This is it:

First—So to conduct ourselves in all our international relations that we never compromise the fundamental principle that all peoples who have proved themselves capable of self-government have a right to an independent government of their own full, free choice.

Second—So to help those freedom-loving peoples who need and want and can profitably use our aid that they may advance in their ability for self-support and may add strength to the security and peace of the free world.

Third—So to manage our commerce with other nations that we are joined with them in a genuine partnership of trade, fostering a spiral of mutually shared prosperity and abundance that will be proof against all propaganda and subversion.

Fourth—So to exemplify at home the opportunities, the rewards for work well done—all the good things of a free system—that the world will recognize in human freedom the sure road to human good.

Working in this manner, we shall expand the areas in which free men, free governments can flourish. We shall help shrink the areas in which human beings can be exploited and their governments subverted.

In this mission, none should play a more important role than free American labor. Your

wholehearted support is assurance of success; your indifference, a guaranty of failure.

More than that, you can most persuasively proclaim this mission to the world. And the world will listen. For you speak with an authentic voice, whose accent reflects all the working places of America.

#### **Proof That Marx Was Wrong**

Above all, in the struggle between the cause of freedom and the cause of communism, you are the living proof that Marx was wrong. Free American labor has prospered in every index of life—in pocketbook and in schooling, in leisure for recreation and culture, in dignity and in spirit:

Not by engaging in a class war;

Not by abandoning to government freedoms and responsibilities;

Not by surrendering any right or duty of free men for the potage of state guarantees;

But by joining in voluntary association to bargain and to negotiate;

By recognizing that the prosperity of agriculture and industry and labor are inseparably joined;

By demonstrating in factory and union meeting and community that American citizenship, with its freedoms and its obligations, is based on a spiritual faith in the equal dignity and equal rights of all men and women.

Therefore, as an American citizen and as President of the United States, I am proud and happy I can be here this evening to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. On its record, the Brotherhood has proved itself a worthy representative of free American labor, a dynamic builder of the free American system.

#### **Honduran Government Recognized**

Press release 561 dated October 27

The United States Embassy at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on October 27 informed the Foreign Minister of Honduras, Esteban Mendoza, that the United States Government has recognized the new Government of Honduras.

## **U.S. Policies and Actions in the Development and Testing of Nuclear Weapons**

*Following are the texts of a statement by President Eisenhower and two related memoranda which were released to the press by the White House on October 23.*

### **STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER**

I have concluded it to be in the public interest to place before you, the American people—and before the world—a full and explicit review of your Government's policies and actions with respect to the development and testing of nuclear weapons, as these affect our national defense, our efforts toward world disarmament, and our quest of a secure and just peace for all nations.

In this cause of world peace, one truth must never be lost from sight. It is this: the critical issue is not a matter of testing nuclear weapons—but of preventing their use in nuclear war. America has repeatedly stated its readiness, indeed its anxiety, to put all nuclear weapons permanently aside—to stop all tests of such weapons—to devote some of our huge expenditures for armament to the greater cause of mankind's welfare—to do all these things whenever, and as soon as, one basic requirement is met. This requirement is that we, as a nation, and all peoples, know safety from attack.

In this spirit and in this awareness, we as a nation have two tasks. First: we must—and do—seek assiduously to evolve agreements with other nations that will promote trust and understanding among all peoples. Second: at the same time, and until that international trust is firmly secured, we must—and do—make sure that the quality and quantity of our military weapons command such respect as to dissuade any other nation from the temptation of aggression.

Thus do we develop weapons, not to wage war, but to prevent war.

Only in the clear light of this greater truth can we properly examine the lesser matter of the testing of our nuclear weapons.

On this specific matter, I last week directed the appropriate Departments and Agencies of your Government to submit to me summaries of all relevant facts in their respective areas of responsibility. This record covers the span of the past 11 years—since the first atomic explosion which occurred in a test in New Mexico. It may be pertinent to note that my direct personal concern with these matters extends almost uninterruptedly over these some 11 years—in my successive capacities as Chief of Staff of the Army, Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe, and, since 1953, as your President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

This record of your Government's policies and actions—insofar as it does not prejudice national security—is herewith made public. It encompasses facts in the several areas of national defense, scientific development, and diplomatic conduct.

This record reflects, clearly and consistently, the persistent, peaceful purposes of our nation.

### **II.**

I deem it proper, in this summary statement, to take note of the most salient points of fact in the accompanying record.

*One.* Your Government has been unremitting in its efforts to ease the burden of armaments for all the world; to establish effective international control of the testing and use of all nuclear weapons, and to promote international use of atomic energy for the needs and purposes of peace. The manifest evidences of this extend from the beginning of this Administration to the present: (a) my appeal to these specific purposes as early as my address of April 16, 1953; (b) the offer of "atoms for peace" in December of the same year; (c) the

appointment of a Special Assistant for Disarmament, with Cabinet rank, to develop and coordinate our efforts toward disarmament; (d) my offer at the Meeting of the Heads of State at Geneva, in July of 1955, for immediate exchange of military blueprints between the United States and the Soviet Union, and mutual air inspection by the "open skies" formula; (e) acceptance of the Soviet proposal for ground-control teams if combined with air inspection; (f) the approval this week of the Statute to govern the International Atomic Energy Agency with 81 nations participating in its peaceful purpose; and (g) our continuing, constructive participation in the work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

Facts such as these have given substance and validity to my statement before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953:

The United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

**Two.** The indispensable principle upon which we have insisted has been the securing of effective safeguards and controls in any program of disarmament. Our readiness to begin disarmament under such safeguards has been affirmed repeatedly during the past three and one-half years. At the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers last autumn, it was specifically reaffirmed by the Secretary of State, with particular reference to nuclear weapons and their testing.

There is only one reason why no safe agreement has been effected to date: the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept any dependable system of mutual safeguards. In the past two years alone, the Soviet Union has rejected no less than 14 American proposals on disarmament and control of nuclear weapons.

**Three.** In the light of these facts, your Government has kept enlarging its stockpile of nuclear weapons, and has continued its development and testing of the most advanced nuclear weapons. The power of these weapons to deter aggression and to guard world peace could be lost if we failed to hold our superiority in these weapons. And the importance of our strength in this particular weapons-field is sharply accented by the unavoidable fact of our numerical inferiority to Communist manpower.

**Four.** The continuance of the present rate of H-bomb testing—by the most sober and responsible scientific judgment—does not imperil the health of humanity. On the amount of radioactive fallout, including strontium 90, resulting from tests, the most authoritative judgment is that of the independent National Academy of Sciences. It reported last June, following a study by 150 scientists of the first rank, that the radiation exposure from all weapons tests to date—and from continuing tests at the same rate—is, and would be, only a small fraction of the exposure that individuals receive from natural sources and from medical X-rays during their lives.

**Five.** On the other hand, the continuance of this testing is having two important beneficial results.

(A) The most recent tests enable us to harness and discipline our weapons more precisely and effectively—drastically reducing their fallout and making them more easy to concentrate, if ever used, upon military objectives. Further progress along this line is confidently expected.

(B) And these same recent tests have helped us to develop—not primarily weapons for vaster destruction—but weapons for defense of our people against any possible enemy attack, as well as knowledge vital to our whole program of civil defense.

**Six.** There is radioactive fallout, including strontium 90, from the testing of all nuclear weapons, of whatever size. But the character of the weapon, as well as its size, determines the fallout. Such fallout cannot be avoided—as has been implied—by limiting tests to the smaller nuclear weapons. Such fallout of strontium 90 as does take place results from the process of atomic fission. Fission is the basic phenomenon of the smaller weapons. Thus, the idea that we can "stop sending this dangerous material into the air"—by concentrating upon small fission weapons—is based upon apparent unawareness of the facts.

**Seven.** With reference to the Soviet Union: its sympathy with the idea of stopping H-bomb tests is indisputable. This idea merely reflects the Soviet Union's repeated insistence, ever since discussion of the Baruch plan in 1946, that all plans for disarmament be based on simple voluntary agreements. Now, as always, this formula allows for no safeguards, no control, no inspection.

**Eight.** A simple agreement to stop H-bomb tests cannot be regarded as automatically self-en-

forcing on the unverified assumption that such tests can instantly and surely be detected. It is true that tests of very large weapons would probably be detected when they occur. We believe that we have detected practically all such tests to date. It is, however, impossible—in view of the vast Soviet land-mass that can screen possible future tests—to have positive assurance of such detection, except in the case of the largest weapons. Nor is it possible to state, immediately following the long-range detection of a test, its size and character.

*Nine.* If your Government were to suspend research and preparation for tests—as well as the tests themselves—and resume such preparation only upon knowledge that another nation had actually exploded another H-bomb, we could find our present commanding lead in nuclear weapons erased or even reversed. For the preparation for such a test may require up to two years.

*Ten.* If your Government were to suspend only its tests, while continuing precautionary research and preparation—if that were feasible—we could still suffer a serious military disadvantage. It requires a year or more to organize and effect such tests as those conducted at our proving ground in the Pacific Ocean.

### III.

These facts dictate two conclusions.

*First.* We must continue—until properly safeguarded international agreements can be reached—to develop our strength in the most advanced weapons—for the sake of our own national safety, for the sake of all free nations, for the sake of peace itself.

*Second.* We must—and we shall—continue to strive ceaselessly to achieve, not the illusion, but the reality of world disarmament. Illusion, in this case, can assume either of two forms. It can mean a reliance upon agreements without safeguards. Or it can be the suggestion that simple suspension of our nuclear tests, without sure knowledge of the actions of others, signifies progress—rather than peril.

There is nothing in postwar history to justify the belief that we should—or that we could even dare—accept anything less than sound safeguards and controls for any disarmament arrangements.

I remain profoundly hopeful that—if we stay strong and steadfast—the reality of significant world disarmament will come to pass.

There is every reason to believe that—if there but be sincerely peaceful purpose on all sides—the nations of the world can achieve and agree upon a system of dependable controls governing disarmament.

We shall never cease striving to this end.

### MEMORANDUM ON WEAPONS TESTS AND PEACEFUL USES OF THE ATOM

In response to a request by the President, the following statement has been prepared by the Executive Branch officials chiefly concerned. It covers:

- I. The United States Program of Testing Atomic Weapons.
- II. Fallout from Atomic Tests.
- III. Long-Range Detection of the Detonation of Nuclear Weapons.
- IV. International Atoms-for-Peace Program.

#### I. The United States Program of Testing Nuclear Weapons

1. Beginning with the first test in 1945, the United States has conducted 13 test series. With the exception of the first test, which was in time of war, each series was publicly announced before it was held.

2. Each of the series and every shot in each series was individually justified and evaluated as necessary for the advancement of our nuclear weapon technology or to gain important weapon effects information.

3. Of the shots in the several series, approximately 20 percent have been of high-yield thermonuclear designs and 80 percent of fission devices.

4. The first test—Trinity—in July 1945 demonstrated the feasibility of an atomic weapon.

5. In July 1946, 2 devices were fired at Operation Crossroads at Bikini Atoll for information as to the effects of atomic bursts on ships.

6. Subsequent tests took place as follows:

- Operation Sandstone during the spring of 1948.
- Operation Ranger in the winter of 1950-51.
- Operation Greenhouse in the spring of 1951.
- Operation Buster-Jangle in the fall of 1951.
- Operation Tumbler-Snapper in the spring of 1952.
- Operation Ivy in the fall of 1952.
- Operation Upshot-Knothole in the spring of 1953.
- Operation Castle in the spring of 1954.
- Operations Teapot and Wigwam in the spring of 1955.
- Operation Redwing in the summer of 1956.

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7. These tests were designed to fulfill, and have fulfilled, the following purposes:

(a) The development of successive designs using less material and therefore increasing the defensive strength of the United States in terms of the amount of material available.

(b) The development of designs of smaller configuration and lighter weight with the objective of providing weapons which can be more readily and effectively used.

(c) The development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons. This development has been of vital importance to our striking force and to its capability to deter aggression.

(d) In the more recent tests the development of warheads for missiles designed to defend our populations and important installations against enemy attack. In the most recent tests, the development of weapons of high yield but low production of fission products. The successful attainment of this objective will make it possible for us to have weapons with greatly reduced radiological hazard (fallout).

8. A major effort in our test series has been to secure information for the protection of our civil population in the event of attack with nuclear weapons. This information has been disseminated to our people through and by the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

9. The time required to prepare for a test series depends upon a number of variables such as:

(a) The state of readiness of devices for test.

(b) Whether the tests are to be conducted at our Eniwetok Proving Grounds or within the Continental limits of the United States (where only small devices can be accommodated).

(c) The number and complexity of the test devices and of the measurements and observations to be made.

The period required for preparation has varied from a minimum of months for the test of simpler, small devices at the Nevada Test Site of the Commission to from 1 to 2 years for tests of larger yield thermonuclear devices at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds.

## II. Fallout From Atomic Tests

10. This phenomenon associated with atomic explosions has been known since Operation Trinity. It acquired a greatly increased importance with

the advent of early thermonuclear weapons although the objectionable fallout of an atomic explosion, especially the component strontium 90, is the result of atomic fission, which is the specific reaction in existing small atomic weapons.

11. The Atomic Energy Commission has been continuously engaged in the study of the biological effect of radiation, both from the point of view of determining safety standards in its installations and for those individuals and institutions to whom radioactive isotopes are supplied, and in connection with the testing operations of the Commission.

12. The Commission has made public all the pertinent information which it had collected on this subject, with due regard to national security. The National Academy of Sciences, the Nation's foremost independent scientific body, engaged in an independent study of the biological effects of atomic radiation, conducted by approximately 150 of the most distinguished authorities in their several fields. The results were publicly reported in June, 1956.

13. The report states that, except for accidents, the biological damage from peacetime activities, which include the testing of atomic weapons, has been "essentially negligible." For a fuller statement of the radiation exposure from all weapons tests to date and from future tests continued at the past testing rate, the *entire* report of the National Academy of Sciences should be examined.

14. As regards fallout of strontium 90 from weapons testing, Dr. Willard F. Libby of the Atomic Energy Commission has stated that the present rate of testing, if continued indefinitely, would not produce a dangerous level of concentration of strontium 90 in the human body. Dr. Shields Warren, eminent radiologist, has stated that bone deposition of strontium 90 is well below the natural background level of radiation, and that to cause harmful effects the dose would have to be increased many times.

15. Mention might be made at this point of various speculations concerning the effect of atomic explosions upon the *weather*. The National Academy of Sciences also established a Committee on Meteorology which gave attention to this question and which concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that climate has been in any way altered by past atomic and thermonuclear explosions.

16. The Atomic Energy Commission has made

extensive reports on the subject of fallout, including the most authoritative scientific data, in testimony before various committees of the Congress.

17. On the initiative of the United States, an international study of the subject was undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. This study is now in progress.

### **III. The Long-Range Detection of the Detonation of Nuclear Weapons**

18. A system for monitoring the occurrence of an explosion, attributable to an atomic source, was initiated by the Government in sufficient time to detect a Soviet nuclear explosion which occurred on the 29th of August, 1949, and which was announced by the President on September 23rd of that year.

19. Including that test and since that date, the organization concerned with this responsibility has detected 7 series of weapons tests within Soviet territory. These series have been announced by our Government as they occurred and were detected. Particular detonations which presented any unusual characteristics have been specifically identified at the time of detection.

20. No Soviet weapons tests series has been publicly announced by the Soviet Government in advance of its occurrence. No description of the effects of tests useful to a program for the protection of civil populations has been made available by the Soviets.

21. The United States long-range monitoring program employs a variety of systems which in the interest of national defense have not been described and, being intelligence operations, should remain classified.

22. While the system of long-range detection or monitoring is believed to be as effective as it can be made in the present state of scientific knowledge, it cannot insure the detection of every test irrespective of size, location, or type and composition of the weapon tested.

23. A determination as to size and nuclear character of detected weapons cannot be reached immediately upon detection, nor for several weeks and occasionally months thereafter. This is particularly true with respect to the larger, more complicated thermonuclear devices.

24. Our evaluation of nuclear weapons tests made by other countries has been dependent upon

the calibration afforded by our own tests of weapons of known characteristics.

### **IV. The Program for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Atoms-for-Peace) and the Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency**

25. When the Administration of President Eisenhower took office, it inherited a disarmament stalemate and an atomic arms race, both of which stemmed largely from the repeated rejections by the U.S.S.R. of the Baruch proposals of 1946-47 for putting all atomic energy under international control.

26. As a result of the President's consideration of this problem, the idea for the Atoms-for-Peace program was evolved and presented to the world in the speech on December 8, 1953, which the President made to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This speech pictured the holocaust of an atomic war, the blessings of an atomic peace, and proposed an international agency to which the powers possessing atomic materials would begin and continue to make contributions of such materials for peaceful uses.

27. Worldwide acclaim of President Eisenhower's proposal made it difficult for the Soviets to succeed in their efforts to sabotage it as they had the Baruch plan.

28. During the protracted negotiations following the speech, the United States took a number of affirmative steps without awaiting establishment of the Agency.

(a) Upon recommendation of President Eisenhower, the Atomic Energy Act was rewritten by the Congress in 1954 in order to permit international cooperation, as a result of which agreements have been entered into with 37 nations, providing for the exchange of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy to build research reactors and power reactors. Scores of students from friendly countries have been trained in technical schools set up by the Atomic Energy Commission. In addition, we have presented atomic energy libraries to 45 friendly nations.

(b) On June 11, 1955, President Eisenhower announced a proposal by our Government to share one-half the cost of research reactors to be built in friendly foreign nations. The purpose was to marshal world opinion in support of a demand that atomic science be used for the benefit of mankind.

(c) We initiated the largest scientific congress ever held (the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, August, 1955) at which a very large amount of nonmilitary atomic information was exchanged.

(d) The President allocated in 1954, 1955, and 1956 a total of 40,200 kilograms of fissionable material for research and power reactors in the United States and abroad.

(e) The United States announced to the Colombo Plan nations in a meeting in Singapore in October 1955 that it would support an Asian Nuclear Research Center for the training of scientists and engineers in the Far East; plans have been formulated for this Research Center to be located in Manila.

(f) The Atomic Energy Commission is assisting in the establishment of a research and training center at the University of Puerto Rico where instruction and training in the nuclear sciences will be given in the Spanish language, thereby expanding the Commission's training program for the special benefit of students from Latin American countries.

(g) In conjunction with the Organization of American States, the Atomic Energy Commission has initiated a program of assistance to the Inter-American Institute of Agriculture Sciences at Turrialba, Costa Rica.

(h) The United States has announced plans for an Inter-American Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to be held next May at the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island.

29. President Eisenhower's United Nations speech in the meantime has borne fruit:

(a) On the initiative of the United States, representatives of 12 nations—including the U.S.S.R.—met in Washington earlier this year and drafted the statute (charter) of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(b) Delegates from 81 nations began a conference on September 20 in New York to consider the statute (charter); agreement was reached today, October 23d.

#### **MEMORANDUM ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS**

In response to a request by the President, the following chronology of principal actions and

events relating to international negotiations concerned with disarmament, control of atomic energy and atomic weapons, and limitation of atomic weapons tests has been provided by the Executive Branch officials chiefly concerned.

1. The foreign ministers of the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. on December 26, 1945, agreed at Moscow to sponsor, in the U.N. General Assembly, a resolution recommending the creation of a U.N. Commission on Atomic Energy (UNAEC).

2. On January 24, 1946, the General Assembly approved a resolution setting up an Atomic Energy Commission.

3. The U.S. representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, Bernard Baruch, presented on June 14, 1946, U.S. proposals for international control of atomic energy. He called for establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority which would own or manage all potentially dangerous activities in atomic energy. The U.S. declared its willingness, under effective control, to give up its atomic weapons monopoly, destroy or dispose of its atomic stocks, and turn over atomic secrets to an international atomic agency in which no nation would wield a veto. The agency would own or manage all potentially dangerous activities in atomic energy and control and license all atomic activities in that field. The U.S. proposal specifically provided that the Authority should be given the exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives, and should foster beneficial uses of atomic energy.

4. On July 19, 1946, the U.S.S.R. proposed an alternative plan for a convention which would forbid "use of atomic weapons in any circumstances," prohibit production of atomic weapons, and provide for destruction of all atomic stocks within three months after ratification of the treaty. The U.S.S.R. insisted on retention of Security Council veto power over any control system. This proposal, in essence, remained the Soviet position through the succeeding years.

5. On December 30, 1946, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission approved by a vote of 10 to 0 (with the U.S.S.R. abstaining) essential principles of the U.S. plan for control of atomic energy.

6. On June 11, 1947, the Soviets made proposals in the Atomic Energy Commission again calling for a convention outlawing production and use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. They called for a separate convention which

would provide for an "International Control Commission" with limited inspection rights, but subject to Security Council veto.

7. On September 11, 1947, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission reaffirmed its approval of the U.S. plan by a vote of 10 to 1 (U.S.S.R. opposed).

8. On May 17, 1948, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission voted 9 to 2 to adjourn indefinitely on grounds that the Soviet position provided no useful basis for further commission discussions.

9. On November 4, 1948, the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 40-6 (the U.S.S.R. opposing) a Canadian resolution approving the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission majority plan (the U.S. proposal) as a basis for "establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy." The resolution created a committee of six to determine if there existed "any basis for agreement on international control of atomic energy."

10. On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced the first atomic explosion in the U.S.S.R.

11. On October 24, 1949, the committee of six reported on fundamental differences between the U.S.S.R. and the Western powers with regard to control of atomic energy. The report concluded that the majority powers put world security above sovereignty, while the U.S.S.R. put its sovereignty first and insisted on unimpeded exercise thereof.

12. The United States on October 24, 1950, proposed that the work of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.N. Commission on Conventional Armaments be more closely brought together and that this work be carried forward by "a new and consolidated disarmament commission."

13. On November 7, 1951, the U.S., U.K. and France sponsored proposals in the U.N., providing for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons. The proposals provided for a progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, and provided that the U.N. majority plan should continue to serve as a basis for control of atomic energy, unless a better or not less effective system could be devised.

14. On November 16, 1951, the U.S.S.R. rejected the tripartite proposal and submitted a

counterproposal calling for a convention prohibiting atomic weapons.

15. On January 11, 1952, the General Assembly adopted a resolution creating the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

16. On January 12, 1952, the U.S.S.R. delegation submitted proposals which provided that prohibition of atomic weapons and "strict international control" of atomic weapons should come into effect simultaneously, but that the control organ not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state.

17. On April 5, 1952, in the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the U.S. cosponsored the first of a series of working papers, including a "proposal for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic."

18. On August 29, 1952, the U.S.S.R. categorically rejected the U.S. sponsored proposals and reaffirmed previous Soviet positions.

19. On November 1, 1952, the U.S. exploded the first hydrogen device at Bikini.

20. On April 8, 1953, the General Assembly noted the impasse in the Disarmament Commission deliberations and requested the Commission to continue its work and report back to the next General Assembly.

21. President Eisenhower in his speech of April 16, 1953, proposed "international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only, and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons" under "adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations."

22. On August 21, 1953, the U.S.S.R. exploded a hydrogen device.

23. In the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1953, the Soviet Union reiterated their proposal for an unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and continued to call for such a prohibition without specifying the nature of controls.

24. The General Assembly on November 28, 1953, adopted by a vote of 54-0, with the Soviets abstaining, a resolution cosponsored by the U.S. which called for the establishment of a subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission "consisting of 'representatives of the powers principally involved' which should seek in private an acceptable solution."

25. President Eisenhower addressing the United

Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953, emphasized U.S. readiness to meet privately with other powers principally involved to seek an acceptable solution to the atomic armaments race and proposed that the governments concerned begin at that time and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency, and that such agency find ways to assure that the contributed materials be devoted to peaceful purposes.

26. The U.S.S.R. on December 12, 1953, indicated a willingness to participate in discussions on the President's proposal but added the reservation that there should be a discussion of an unconditional obligation not to employ hydrogen, atomic or other weapons of mass destruction.

27. On April 2, 1954, Prime Minister Nehru proposed a "standstill agreement" on tests of nuclear weapons.

28. On May 25, 1954, the U.S. introduced into the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee a proposal for the establishment of international control organs to enforce a disarmament program.

29. On May 28, 1954, the World Peace Council (Communist) launched a demand for a cessation of tests together with a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.

30. The U.S. supported a French-U.K. proposal of June 11, 1954, in the Disarmament Subcommittee which called for a phased approach to disarmament through successive stages and for nuclear disarmament phased with reduction of conventional arms and forces. The proposal included a proviso that states would regard themselves as prohibited from using nuclear weapons except in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

31. In late June 1954, after consideration of the matter with his top officials, President Eisenhower adopted an interdepartmental recommendation that the United States should not at that time agree to a test moratorium, but that disarmament policy review should be continued and expedited.

32. After initial rejection of the Anglo-French proposal, the U.S.S.R., on September 30, 1954, announced at the U.N. General Assembly that it would accept that proposal as a basis for a draft international convention on disarmament.

33. On November 4, 1954, the General Assembly unanimously called for "further efforts . . . to reach agreement," by the Disarmament Committee.

34. On November 23, 1954, the Communist

World Peace Council proposed that the great powers reach "immediate agreement on the banning of all experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs," and combined this with a demand that governments undertake "never to use nuclear weapons whatever may be the pretext."

35. On February 23, 1955, President Eisenhower at a news conference stated that the United States sees nothing to be gained by a separate ban on thermonuclear tests outside of a decent and proper disarmament.

36. In the resumed meetings of the U.N. Subcommittee the U.S. during March 1955 called attention to the difficulties that had arisen in "accounting fully for all past production of nuclear materials" which "raises doubt that presently foreseeable plans can completely guarantee the elimination of all nuclear weapons."

37. On March 8, 1955, the U.S., U.K., France and Canada submitted a proposal to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee on the timing or phasing of a disarmament program; which was not accepted by the U.S.S.R.

38. On March 12, 1955, the U.S., U.K., France and Canada submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee a joint draft resolution for the U.N. General Assembly on the principles to govern reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments; which was not accepted by the U.S.S.R.

39. To undertake a complete review of disarmament problems and to develop an approach taking account of the growing technological problems that had arisen, the President on March 19, 1955, appointed Harold E. Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament and directed that special studies of basic U.S. policy on the matter be made, utilizing men both in and out of Government.

40. On April 21, 1955, the U.S., U.K., France and Canada submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee a joint draft resolution for the U.N. General Assembly on the principles of disarmament controls; which was rejected by the U.S.S.R.

41. At the U.N. Subcommittee in London the Soviet Union, on May 10, 1955, recognized that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading control and for organizing clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons." The Soviet Union further recognized the danger of mounting nuclear stock-

piles and the necessity of guarding against surprise attack. The U.S.S.R. made a disarmament proposal which included, without provision of safeguards, as one of the first measures of its execution: "the reduction of arms and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen bombs shall pledge themselves to discontinue tests of these weapons."

42. The first comprehensive report of the Special Assistant on Disarmament was presented to the President on May 26, 1955. This report stressed, among other things, the extreme importance of providing against surprise attack, the absolute necessity of effective inspection in any agreement, the role of an aerial component and of scientific instruments and photography in such a system.

43. The President, in June, 1955, considered and approved the conclusions of an interagency group, following a second review of the matter, to the effect that a moratorium on H-bomb testing would not be in the interest of the U.S. and should not be agreed to except as a part of a comprehensive safeguard disarmament agreement.

44. On June 22, 1955, the U.S. announced a proposal that the United Nations undertake to pool the world's knowledge about the effects of atomic radiation on human health, and later requested that this item be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly; subsequently a resolution to this effect was adopted.

45. On July 18, 1955, while the Summit Meeting at Geneva was proceeding the Soviet Union indicated that it was ready to participate in negotiations for the establishment of an international atomic energy agency.

46. President Eisenhower at the Geneva Meeting of heads of government on July 21, 1955, gave a comprehensive statement of the broad principles of U.S. policy and proposed that as a practical step the Soviet Union and United States, the two great countries which possess new and terrible weapons in quantities, agree immediately to an exchange of blueprints of their military establishments and to provide each other with facilities for aerial reconnaissance. The President stated that such a step would provide against the possibility of a great surprise attack and would be but a beginning toward a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament.

47. On the same day, Marshal Bulganin re-

iterated the Soviet proposal for establishment of control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and airdromes, in order to prevent surprise attack.

48. The U.S. on August 30, 1955, presented an outline plan for the implementation of the President's proposal to the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament at the beginning of a series of meetings at the U.N. Headquarters in New York; which was rejected by the U.S.S.R.

49. Marshal Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower on September 19, 1955, raised objections to the "open skies" proposal.

50. On October 7, 1955, the U.S. proposed an extension of President Eisenhower's plan of aerial inspection to cover other countries, thus applying to U.S. bases overseas; which was not accepted by the U.S.S.R.

51. President Eisenhower on October 11, 1955, in a letter to Marshal Bulganin encouraged further study by the Soviet Union of the Geneva proposal and stated United States willingness to accept the Soviet proposal for ground control teams, along with the President's open skies proposal. The U.S.S.R. continued to reject the open skies proposal.

52. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva on November 10, 1955, Mr. Molotov indicated willingness of the Soviet Union to consider the concept of aerial photography as one of the forms of control to be considered "at the concluding stage of the implementation of measures to reduce armaments and to prohibit atomic weapons."

53. On November 11, 1955, at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, Secretary Dulles stated that "if agreement can be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the United States would be prepared to agree to corresponding restrictions on the testing of such weapons."

54. On November 29, 1955, Secretary Dulles stated at a press conference that the question of suspension of nuclear testing had been studied for a great many months, and that no formula had been found which would be both dependable and in the interest of the U.S. with regard to the protection of people and freedom in the world.

55. The United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1955, adopted by a vote of 56-7, against Soviet opposition, a resolution cosponsored

by the United States which urged that the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission give priority to (a) such confidence building measures as the President's open skies plan and the Bulganin ground inspection plan, and (b) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.

56. Marshal Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower on February 1, 1956, again declined to enter into an aerial inspection system.

57. On December 24, 1955, Pope Pius XII in a Christmas broadcast declared that the three steps of "renunciation of experimentation with atomic weapons, renunciation of the use of such, and general control of armaments" must be effected together.

58. On January 25, 1956, Governor Stassen testifying before the U.S. Senate Disarmament Subcommittee reiterated U.S. policy and pointed out that we do not have the technical facilities to detect all test explosions.

59. On February 14, 1956, Khrushchev before the 20th CPSU Congress in Moscow stated "we are willing to take certain partial steps—for example to discontinue the thermonuclear weapon tests. . . ."

60. In a letter to Premier Bulganin of March 1, 1956, President Eisenhower answered questions regarding the "open skies" proposal, and added a proposal for efforts to bring under control the nuclear threat and reverse the trend toward a constant increasing of nuclear weapons hanging over the world. He stated the United States would be prepared to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. The President suggested that this might be combined with his proposal of December 8, 1953, "to begin now and continue to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles of normal uranium of fissionable materials to an international atomic agency. The President stated that the ultimate hope of this Government is that all production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

61. On March 21, 1956, the U.S. presented to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission at London a proposal for a demonstration test area of open skies inspection in a strip of land 300 miles long and 100 miles wide in the U.S.S.R. and

in the U.S.; which was rejected by the U.S.S.R.

62. On March 21, 1956, the U.S. proposed to the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee immediate exchanges for a test period of technical missions for purposes of preliminary study of the methods of control and inspection; which was not accepted by the U.S.S.R.

63. On March 22, 1956, the U.S. proposed to the U.N. Subcommittee that, subject to certain accompanying conditions and safeguards, the first phase level of reduced armed forces and armaments should be on a basis of measurement of 2.5 million men each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R., 750,000 each for the U.K. and France.

64. On March 26, 1956, the U.S. proposed to the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, as part of an air and ground inspection system, the advance notification of planned movements of armed units through international air or water or over foreign soil; which was not accepted by the U.S.S.R.

65. On March 27, 1956, the U.S.S.R. proposed at the London meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee the discontinuance of further tests of thermonuclear weapons as a measure independent of attainment of agreement on general disarmament.

66. At the London meetings of the Disarmament Subcommittee, the U.S. delegation on April 3, 1956, put forward a working paper suggesting a step-by-step plan for a first phase of a comprehensive disarmament program including limitation on conventional armaments, provision against surprise attack, including President Eisenhower's proposals for control of the nuclear threat, and limitations on the testing of nuclear weapons as part of a safeguarded disarmament program. The paper included a proviso that "the testing of nuclear weapons will be limited and monitored in an agreed manner," by an armaments regulation council which the U.S. proposed should be established. This proposal was not accepted by the U.S.S.R.

67. On April 21, 1956, Mr. Stevenson urged that the U.S. "give prompt and earnest consideration to stopping further tests of the hydrogen bomb."

68. On April 23, 1956, Governor Stassen at the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee in London stated that the U.S. is prepared to agree to restrictions on the testing of nuclear weapons provided there has been agreement on an effective limitation of nuclear weapons under proper safeguards as a

part of the disarmament agreement, and provided this agreement limiting nuclear weapons has been satisfactorily carried out.

69. On April 24, 1956, Governor Stassen held a discussion with Bulganin and Khrushchev in London in which the necessity, method, and sincerity of the "open skies" proposal and 2.5 million force level were presented at length and debated.

70. On April 25, 1956, President Eisenhower at his press conference stated that the United States has no more interest in developing bigger nuclear weapons, but is proceeding with testing to find ways and means to limit the weapon, to make it useful for air defense, to reduce fallout, and to make it more a military weapon and less one of mass destruction.

71. On May 4, 1956, the four Western powers, in a joint declaration at end of Subcommittee meetings, reiterated the necessity for a "strong" control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outset and developing in parallel with the disarmament measures.

72. On June 6, 1956, Marshal Bulganin in a letter to the President announced the intention to cut the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 1.2 million men.

73. In the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the U.S.S.R. supported a Yugoslav draft resolution of July 10, 1956, which called for "such initial disarmament measures as are now feasible and such forms and degrees of control as are required for these measures" and specified as one such measure "the cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons as well as other practicable measures in the field of nuclear armaments."

74. On July 12, 1956, Mr. Gromyko of the U.S.S.R. in the U.N. Disarmament Commission, made a statement accepting the figure of 2.5 million men for the armed forces of the U.S. and the Soviets, but only as a first step, and without accepting the accompanying conditions and safeguards.

75. On July 13, 1956, in the Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Wadsworth stated that "in the absence of agreement to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, continuation of testing is essential for our national defense and the security of the free world."

76. On July 16, 1956, the U.S., U.K., France and Canada proposed to the Disarmament Com-

mission the principles on which a sound disarmament program could be based; which was rejected by the U.S.S.R.

77. On July 16, 1956, the 12-nation U.N. Disarmament Commission adopted a resolution recalling the terms of the General Assembly resolution endorsing the open skies, and requested the Subcommittee to continue its studies.

78. Also on July 16, 1956, U.S.S.R. Foreign Affairs Minister Shepilov, before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, stated the "question of discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons can be . . . settled independently" of disarmament agreement.

79. President Eisenhower in a letter of August 4 to Premier Bulganin reaffirmed the proposals of his March 1, 1956, letter and asked if progress could not be made on the matter.

80. On August 26, 1956, the White House announced that the Soviets had exploded a nuclear device two days earlier.

81. On August 31, 1956, the President announced that a second Soviet atomic explosion had occurred on the previous day.

82. On September 3, 1956, the AEC announced that a third explosion in the test series had taken place on the preceding day.

83. On September 5, 1956, Mr. Stevenson, at the American Legion Convention, restated his proposal as "to halt further testing of large nuclear devices, conditioned upon adherence by the other powers to a similar policy."

84. On September 10, 1956, the Soviets announced that a nuclear weapon test had occurred that same day.

85. Marshal Bulganin in a letter to President Eisenhower on September 11, 1956, rejected the President's proposal that further production of fissionable material no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. He stated that to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons without forbidding their use and without eliminating them from the armaments of nations would "not in any measure solve the problem of eliminating the threat of atomic war." He also stated that discontinuation of nuclear tests "does not in itself require any international control agreements"; that it was possible to "separate the problem of ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons from the general problem of disarmament"; and that "an agreement among nations

concerning the termination" of such tests would be "the first important step toward the unconditional prohibition of these types of weapons."

86. On October 6, 1956, President Eisenhower issued a statement that "the testing of atomic weapons to date has been, and continues, an indispensable part of our defense program"; and that "as part of a general disarmament program, the American Government, at the same time, has consistently affirmed and reaffirmed its readiness—indeed its strong will—to restrict and control both the testing and the use of nuclear weapons under specific and supervised international disarmament agreement."

87. From October 8 through October 12, Italian aerial reconnaissance tests were conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and value of the Eisenhower open skies proposal.

88. On October 17, 1956, Marshal Bulganin in a letter to President Eisenhower stated, "Until the necessary agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons is attained, it would, in our opinion, be desirable to reach agreement at this time on at least the first step toward the solution of the problem of atomic weapons—the prohibition of testing atomic and hydrogen weapons. . ." He also stated, "We fully share the opinion recently expressed by certain prominent public figures in the United States concerning the necessity and the possibility of concluding an agreement on the matter of prohibiting atomic weapon tests. . ."

89. On October 21, 1956, President Eisenhower, in a letter to Marshal Bulganin, stated:

The United States has for a long time been intensively examining, evaluating and planning dependable means of stopping the arms race and reducing and controlling armaments. These explorations include the constant examination and evaluation of nuclear tests. To be effective, and not simply a mirage, all these plans require systems of inspection and control, both of which your Government has steadfastly refused to accept. Even my "Open Skies" proposal of mutual aerial inspection, suggested as a first step, you rejected.

However, though disappointed, we are not discouraged. We will continue unrelenting in our efforts to attain these goals. We will close no doors which might open a secure way to serve humanity.

We shall entertain and seriously evaluate all proposals from any source which seem to have merit, and we shall constantly seek for ourselves formulations which might dependably remove the atomic menace.

90. Currently, interdepartmental preparations are going forward, under direction of the President, for further efforts to reach a sound agreement for a thoroughly inspected system which will improve the prospects of a durable peace. This work is in specific preparation for renewed consideration of the subject in the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee and in the next session of the General Assembly.

## **Italian Demonstration of Aerial Photography**

White House press release dated October 23

*Following is a message from President Eisenhower to President Giovanni Gronchi of Italy.*

OCTOBER 22, 1956

I have followed with close attention the Italian Government's demonstration last week of the practicability of using modern aircraft as sentinels of peace. The lessons to be learned from your government's demonstration of aerial photography over the City of Rome and other Italian centers will be studied with keen interest by all governments interested in achieving a lasting peace.

I congratulate the Italian Government on this significant initiative directed toward the building of international confidence. It is a valuable contribution to public understanding of one essential element of a meaningful disarmament agreement.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## A Review of United States Foreign Policy

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy<sup>1</sup>

It is a great privilege to enjoy this opportunity to meet with the members of the Institute of International Affairs of Seattle this evening. At the time of my last visit here incident to the opening of the International Trade Fair Exposition<sup>2</sup> I learned something of the interest of your community in matters relating to American foreign policy and I also obtained a good deal of inspiration from your knowledge of many of the problems on which the Department of State is constantly engaged. We in the Department of State want to keep in the closest possible touch with the thinking of representative groups such as yourselves in a world situation which is fraught not only with anxieties and problems but with constructive opportunities as well.

I would like to take this occasion to pay tribute to the initiative shown by this community in the field of international relations. I refer to the International Trade Fair, which was begun in 1951 as a result of a trip to Japan of a group of Seattle businessmen. I think this has proved a significant contribution to the well-being of this area as well as to our relations with both Asian and Latin American nations. I know this has not been an easy task and that a number of people in this community have borne an extra-heavy burden in connection with it. Perhaps in the District of Columbia the future will see more support of a practical nature given to this demonstration of an affirmative interest in better relations with our friends abroad.

It should be recalled, of course, that the basic objective of U.S. foreign policy is the welfare and

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Institute of International Affairs at the University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., on Oct. 24 (press release 551 dated Oct. 23).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 28, 1955, p. 521.

security of the American people. Everything that we do in the Department of State is intended to work to that end. I might add that, as you know, one of the major features of this policy effort is the system of collective security which has been painstakingly constructed. We have now security arrangements with 42 nations. This system of alliances is based on a forward strategy and incident to it we maintain bases in many parts of the world around an extended periphery.

I would like to stress that we view these alliances not as a design only for the selfish purposes of the United States but to serve the mutual needs of our country and the other countries involved. There is at times perhaps inevitably a tendency on the part of some of our friends abroad to believe that they are doing the United States a favor pure and simple in extending the facilities. This at times becomes the subject of aggressive bargaining in an effort to extract from the United States the maximum in the way of advantages. It is, of course, obvious that the foreign country where we might have base privileges gains a considerable advantage in the increased security and protection against aggression which the presence of our forces there offers.

If you will permit a personal reference, when I was Ambassador to Japan in 1952 right after the Japanese peace treaty came into effect, I initiated on behalf of the United States the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. I became acquainted at that time with Seattle's active interest in a problem which concerned the United States, Canada, and Japan. As you know, the international fisheries relations of our country are now in a period of great ferment and, we believe, of constructive growth. This evening, with your permission, I

would like to deal briefly with some aspects of the fisheries problem, and then perhaps we could make what the French like to call a *tour d'horizon* of situations relating to our foreign policy in the Far East, the Middle East, and Europe.

#### International Fisheries Problem

I need not tell you in Seattle how important to the Northwest, and to the whole United States, are the great Pacific fisheries from the Columbia River northward to Alaska. They would be ruined by uncontrolled international competition, but fortunately there is a powerful trend in the world today toward conservation on a cooperative basis. That there is such a trend is in no small part owing to the examples of what are unquestionably the two greatest experiments in international conservation treaties—our agreements with Canada on Pacific halibut and sockeye salmon. Many things are happening in fisheries at this moment. Today in Ottawa a United States delegation is negotiating with Canadian representatives on the conservation of the pink salmon of the Juan de Fuca-Georgia Strait area. If this conference is successful—and we believe it will be—pink salmon which are of joint interest to our fishermen and Canadian fishermen will be placed under a U. S.-Canadian regime similar to that which has for 20 years been so effective in the sockeye-salmon fishery.

I am glad to say that at that conference table in Ottawa, sitting as members of the United States delegation, are seven citizens of the State of Washington. They include the Director of the Washington State Department of Fisheries and his technical coordinator, the Dean of the School of Fisheries of the University of Washington, and four representatives of the salmon industry of this State.

In Washington, D.C., the North Pacific Fur Seal Conference is now moving toward a successful close. Japan and the Soviet Union as well as the United States and Canada are all taking part. You will remember the four-power Fur Seal Treaty of 1911 was terminated in 1941. The present negotiations are seeking to reestablish a new four-power arrangement for the proper conservation of this important resource. This negotiation has been a long one—it is almost a year old now. We have had a hard time trying to reconcile widely different positions and at the same time protecting our own interests. We think we

have been able to do so. Fur seals raise many large questions for the four nations—not only scientific questions but questions of search and seizure of ships on the high seas, of the authority of an international commission over a resource of this kind, and the very large question of the relative interests of nations in a marine creature such as the seal, which is born on the land of one country but spends most of its life—9 months each year—at sea.

I have, myself, had a limited part in the Fur Seal Conference. I talked on several occasions to both the Japanese and the Soviet representatives in an effort to work out a compromise. Perhaps the main thing I learned from the conference was the following description of a fur seal which I quote: "Amphibious is the fur seal, ubiquitous and carnivorous, uniparous, gregarious and withal polygamous." I might say that I had to look up "uniparous" in the dictionary, where I found that it means producing but one egg at a time.

Your own city will, on November 12, play host to the annual meeting of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission. The principal fisheries experts of the United States, Canada, and Japan will gather in Seattle, and I believe also that the Commission has extended an invitation to the Soviet Union to send observers to the meeting.

#### U. S. Policies in the Pacific Area

Since I was out here a year and a half ago discussing the situation in the Far East, events in the Middle East and Africa have had a tendency to push the Far East out of the headlines. You may recall that at that time the situation in the Far East was extremely tense during the crises over the Taiwan Straits. I need not tell you who live on the west coast that developments in Asia have a vital bearing on our national security. During the interval since my last visit we feel that progress has been made in the furtherance of our policies in the Pacific area. The lines of the free world-Communist struggle are more clearly drawn, and the concept of liberty is working its inevitable erosion within the rigid structure of communistic dictatorship. Communism in the Far East has reacted as it has elsewhere in other times and other places. Wherever it has found a solid bedrock of determined resistance, it has turned away and sought instead for the soft spots more to its liking. It has abandoned methods of

outright military aggression and has resorted to classical nonmilitary methods intended to deceive the ingenuous.

In Korea we have witnessed flagrant violation of the terms of the armistice by the Communist authorities in the North who, though they have reduced the Chinese Communist manpower in North Korea, have illegally modernized the force structure, created a new air force, and have brought in new weapons. The United States as part of the United Nations forces in Korea has scrupulously respected the terms of the armistice during the 3-year period which has elapsed since its signing. The armistice provisions were never designed to maintain the position in perpetuity but to provide for an interim period leading to a political conference. Due to Communist obstruction, the political conference proved impracticable and the state of armistice continues. However, the Republic of Korea forces and those of the United Nations will not again be taken by surprise. They would not be denied means for effective defense against future aggression.

In Southeast Asia, the Republic of Viet-Nam has made remarkable strides in achieving political, economic, and military stability in the free area of a country which remains unhappily divided and occupied in the North by Communists. On Friday of this week President Diem will officiate at the celebration of the first anniversary of the Republic, which has now drafted a new constitution as its basic charter. The United States continues to provide substantial support and encouragement to the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle to promote the growth of democratic government in this important area. We are co-operating with the Republic of Viet-Nam in several fields and we believe that this policy, in addition to promoting the best interests of the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam, also contributes to our national security.

#### **Conversations With Chinese Communists**

Conversations between American and Red Chinese representatives continue at Geneva, Switzerland. One product of these conversations has been the release of some of our citizens wrongfully detained in Red China, most of them jailed and mistreated. By this process the number has been reduced from 52 to 10, and we propose to continue our efforts until the last American held there has been released. For the rest, the Chinese Commu-

nists have been unwilling to renounce the use of force in the Formosa area. In the Straits, although some shooting continues, large-scale hostilities have been averted, largely because the United States in concert with the Republic of China made its determination clear to resist overt aggression.

The Chinese Communists continue to dangle before some of the hard-pressed nations of Asia their offers of aid and trade. In some cases where these offers have been accepted already disillusionment has developed and the hard realities of dealing with a Communist state are beginning to be better understood. Never was the old adage, "All is not gold that glitters," more applicable than in the case of Red Chinese specious offers of large-scale profitable trade.

One of the techniques of the "new look" is to attempt the development of "cultural contacts," and in this endeavor the Chinese Reds have been having some success, particularly with some other Asian countries. Finding us unmoved by threats of force, the bombardment of the cultural offensive has been trained on the United States, which in the more austere days of the Communist hate campaign was supposed to have no culture. Now an effort is being made to induce our scholars, our musicians, our artists, and our writers to come to Communist China. They have even tried to make a Communist hero out of Benjamin Franklin as attractive sugar coating for Americans.

We have taken the position that, so long as Americans are being held as political hostages, the United States cannot consider modifying its opposition to travel by Americans in Red China. To do so would be yielding to extortion. There would be no end to it.

Naturally we have followed the conversations between our Japanese friends and the Soviet Union with active interest. These conversations have resulted in the signature on October 19 by the Japanese Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin of two documents: one a peace declaration and the other a trade protocol. According to these agreements the state of war between Japan and the Soviet Union is ended and diplomatic and cultural relations are established. One significant feature of the peace declaration is that the Soviet Union will now support Japan's application for admission to membership to the United Nations, and both partners agree to be guided by the principles of the

U.N. Charter. The only territorial decision taken is agreement by the Soviet Union to transfer to Japan the small islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The agreement brings into force the convention on fishing in the open seas in the northwest part of the Pacific between the Soviet Union and Japan and promises that measures will be taken to preserve and develop the fish reserves and to regulate and limit the catching of fish in the open sea. These agreements, of course, leave many questions for future settlement, particularly in the field of trade between the two countries.

The steady quiet development of the Southeast Asia collective-defense treaty organization, known as SEATO, is heartening evidence that other Asian nations are equally alert to the Communist peril. In this organization five nations in Asia—Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines—have joined with England, France, and the United States in an agreement to oppose further aggression or subversion in Southeast Asia. How much this single fact may have influenced the course of history in Asia may not be known for many years. This expression of common determination is a vital and lasting contribution to peace in the Pacific area.

Your thoughts here in the Northwest turn naturally to the Orient, where ties of historic tradition, economic interest, and geographic location lead them. We bear this constantly in mind, but at the same time we try to see the whole picture in perspective.

#### **The Suez Crisis**

The attention of the whole world recently has focused on the Suez crisis. This situation came about, as you know, because Egypt undertook to control a waterway which for many years had been under international operation. This action was taken under circumstances which indicated that the purpose of the Egyptian Government was to exercise its control in such a way as to promote what Colonel Nasser repeatedly described as the "grandeur" of Egypt rather than to operate the canal in the general interest. Your Secretary of State has been laboring round the clock since August skillfully and energetically seeking a peaceful, effective, and just solution of an exceedingly complex problem.

The United Nations Security Council on October 13 unanimously adopted six principles

which it is hoped may govern efforts to solve the problem.<sup>3</sup> This step reflected substantial progress toward a peaceful solution. A most significant principle is that the operation of the canal shall be insulated from the politics of any nation. This principle was opposed by the Soviet Union when we advanced it in London last August; so its unanimous adoption now is an indication that we are moving forward. The Security Council also agreed that there should be no discrimination, overt or covert, among users of the canal.

This particular crisis, of course, must be viewed against the backdrop of the complex Arab-Israel relations and of important American interests in the Middle East. Your Government has persistently made substantial efforts to bring about improved Arab-Israel relations, which continue in an uneasy state of armistice charged by emotionalism. The United States has given strong support to the Secretary-General of the U.N. in his repeated efforts to devise means to end the unhappily persisting series of incidents. All of our efforts, through every channel available to us, have been directed toward achieving a peaceful settlement of this troublesome issue.

Throughout the world we are faced with varying degrees and rates of change. As we concern ourselves with those things which have changed, we must bear in mind those things which remain unchanged.

#### **The Soviet Union Today**

Nowhere is this more true than in the Soviet Union of today. There is no doubt that important changes have occurred in its policies since Stalin's death in 1953, and there can be no question that we should recognize these changes and allow for them. But it would be as dangerous for us to ignore those things which have not changed as to fail to recognize things which have changed.

In the first place the Soviet Union of today remains as devoted as was the Soviet Union of yesterday to the eventual destruction of our freedom and way of life. The Communist leaders themselves have stated plainly that the change in their manners does not indicate a change in their purpose. In fact the Russians publicly told us that pigs will fly before such a change occurs.

In the second place the Soviets continue to support their hostile and aggressive purpose with a

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1956, p. 616.

continuing military buildup. It is true that they have announced a reduction of their ground force. But the evidence is abundant that they are continuing with the rapid improvement of all important weapons, including the new weapons of mass destruction and the aircraft and missiles with which to deliver them.

In the third place Soviet efforts are still largely devoted to the expansion of heavy industry. Thus popular welfare continues to have a low priority, while the economic power required to support their military buildup continues to receive primary attention. I am told the division of investment between heavy industries and consumer-goods industries remains at a 10 to 1 ratio, showing that the "creature comforts," except for a special few, are not objects of serious official concern.

In the fourth place the Soviet Union continues to be a dictatorship. Only tyrannical and absolute rule could continue the present enforced military buildup, with all that it entails. The new leadership is collective and does not attempt to endow its members with the godlike attributes of Stalinist days. But in the Soviet Union there are still no checks against abuse by those who continue to hold unlimited power.

Finally, the Soviet bloc of nations has been in the past a tightly organized group, with the U.S.S.R. the dominant and dominating member, and there is as yet no evidence of any thorough-going change. We must in prudence assume that, while the Soviet leaders are finding it expedient to modify their techniques of dominance, the dominance continues, with the military and economic resources this places at the Soviet command.

These, then, are the things which remain unchanged in the Soviet Union: its purposes, its military power, its technique of maneuver—as in the A-bomb test issue—its industrial expansion, its dictatorial government, and its dominant control over the populations and resources of the Soviet-bloc nations.

#### **Stalinist Methods Bringing Diminishing Returns**

It seems clear, however, that the changes have been changes of detail and approach rather than of fundamentals. Stalinist methods were bringing diminishing returns in terms of industrial output and loyalty to the state. Public resentment, unable to find expression otherwise, showed itself in sullen unresponsiveness. Therefore the leaders

resorted to concessions, adjustments, and liberalizing gestures in order to make the Communist system and the Soviet state more effective.

In foreign affairs also it is clear that Stalinist policies of threat and force were bringing losses rather than gains; so here, too, the leadership made changes. As an alternative to bluster and brutality they are trying "peaceful coexistence." The first step in showing the world they could co-exist was to heal the breach with Yugoslavia, and this they did. Along the same lines was their ostensible loosening of Soviet control over the satellites. Another step has been to bring out the old device of the "united front," by means of which Communist parties in other nations attempt to gain influence and respectability by forming alliances with other left-wing groups. The Soviets have also sought by all means to promote neutralism among free nations, apparently feeling that those nations who are not against them may someday join with them. They have turned the main focus of their efforts upon free Asia, Africa, and Latin America, although they have by no means abandoned their purpose of improving their position in Europe.

Soviet policy toward the less-developed countries stresses the exploiting of local disputes and economic problems and the use of trade and technical assistance. Its short-term purpose is to disrupt cooperative arrangements among free nations, especially NATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Baghdad Pact. In the longer run we may safely assume that they hope to find an opportunity to bring these nations under Communist domination and to use their resources to tip the balance of world power in their favor.

There is little to be gained from idle debate as to whether the new Soviet look is more or less dangerous to the free world and to America than the Stalinist one. The answer depends chiefly upon how we conduct ourselves.

There are certain general principles which must guide our actions, I believe, if we are successfully to deal with the problems posed by the new Soviet approach. I want to touch upon two of these principles.

The postwar Soviet expansion was checked without another world war because resistance to it was organized among the free nations. America played an important role in organizing the mutual defense agreements upon which this resistance was built. We invested heavily in

these arrangements, and it is now the evident purpose of the Soviets to destroy them. If they succeed in this purpose, the individual free nations which are party to the agreements will find their freedom and survival gravely threatened. Unless we continue to devote ourselves to maintaining these arrangements, the Soviet chances will be good.

This is not to say that our military programs abroad cannot be improved. Studies now under way might well disclose the need for alterations. But the essential function—to join together our strength in order to guard our freedom—remains a first principle of our foreign policy.

The other principle with which I want to deal has to do with the other great area of our mutual security effort, the economic. The underlying principle of our economic effort is not as obvious as the one which underlies our defense arrangements. The need for a military defense against a military threat is relatively easy to understand. That is why the Stalinist policy of threat finally became unproductive. The free nations became aroused and united. A program of economic penetration and cultural and scientific exchanges is far subtler than military threat. It is harder to identify and less easy to evaluate. It is more difficult, in terms of ideas, to devise a means of meeting it, and, once a means has been devised, it is more difficult to obtain broad public understanding, interest, and support.

Yet our opponents have turned some of their best efforts toward economic penetration; so it is essential that we Americans understand how this new Soviet effort has been mounted and how this new threat, like the old one, can be dealt with.

#### **Communism and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy**

I think we must remember several things in connection with foreign economic policy:

In the first place, we must realize that the pressure for economic development among the young nations, the less-developed countries of the Near East, Africa, and free Asia, is not going to abate in our time. This is a vast, historic tide, whose power no nation can long resist or ignore. The Soviets know this and seek to use this movement to their advantage. They hope that among the problems and needs that will arise as this tide of economic expansion moves along they will find opportunities for gaining influence within the young nations and ultimately control over them.

Now, in the second place, we must recognize that America's basic aim in the world is consistent with the desire of other nations to be independent, while the Soviet aim is not. As a nation founded on liberty we can only be true to our heritage if we respect the right of other nations to achieve and maintain liberty. And in a world where other nations desire to be free, the key to our own security lies in the continued existence of a system of free and independent nations, unified toward the end of protecting their freedom. The Soviets, by contrast, are committed by doctrine, by political faith, to seek to extend their control over other states and to see in this control their only security. Freedom anywhere threatens tyranny everywhere; thus tyranny anywhere is hostile to freedom everywhere.

Now, if we recognize the determination of the young nations to make freedom a going concern through adding economic development to their political independence, and if we accept that the key to our own security lies in the continued existence of a system of free nations, then the third point follows of necessity. It is not enough merely to offer our sympathy and good wishes to nations seeking to give their freedom permanent reality. We must help them.

The details of our foreign economic policies are being examined and debated at this time, and it is neither proper nor necessary for me to enter that debate. But whatever changes, if any, are finally made, they must take into account the fact that the Soviet economic offensive cannot be met by a negative program of attempting to match whatever the other side does, nor by trying to outbid them in offers of assistance. Rather we must follow a positive program of seeing to it that our help is made available to those nations which need it in order to remain free.

The effect of economic conditions upon communism is rather graphically illustrated right here in our own land. William Z. Foster, who is at least nominally the head of the American Communist Party, recently explained publicly the reasons why communism has lost influence in America. Writing for the Communist newspaper, *The Daily Worker*, he said that the relatively good economic conditions which workers in this country have enjoyed in recent years have done more to restrict the growth of communism in America than any other factor.

In many years of experience in many lands it has been my observation that men frequently embrace tyranny where freedom has failed to offer them a decent life.

Against this background perhaps the reasons behind the decision to continue economic aid to Marshal Tito begin to come into focus. In assisting Yugoslavia we do not endorse its form of government, nor the philosophy upon which its government is based. Our aid is offered rather because Yugoslavia continues to be independent of Soviet control and has needed assistance to continue its independence.

The value to the free world and to enslaved peoples of continued Yugoslav independence is clearly illustrated by recent events. When the Soviet Union sought to achieve a more peaceful relationship with the rest of the free world, it had first to make its peace with Marshal Tito. But acknowledging the "respectability" of Tito in turn made Titoism in some measure respectable, and this has lent encouragement to the other satellites in seeking greater independence from Moscow. The recent events in Warsaw illuminate this point. The new trend appears to have come into conflict with the degree of authority which Moscow wishes to continue to exercise over the other satellites. It is reported that the Soviets have warned the other Communist parties against overly great fraternization with the Yugoslavs, who encourage the trend toward independence. The Tito-Khrushchev talks appear to have been an effort on the part of Moscow to convince President Tito of the dangers of too liberal an interpretation of the new "equality" among all Communist parties. So far there is no evidence that the Yugoslavs have retreated from their independent position.

Thus our aid to Yugoslavia has helped to bring about some loosening of the bonds upon the once-free nations of Eastern Europe. It has helped create problems for the Communist leaders which they have not yet been able to resolve.

#### **United Nations Day**

Today we are celebrating United Nations Day. It is entirely fitting that we pause from our preoccupation with the immediate problems facing us and speak for a moment about this important birthday.

Eleven years ago today the U.N. Charter, drafted here on the Pacific coast and signed by 51 nations, came into effect. There have been a

lot of changes in the world since 1945. The U.N. has in many ways become something quite different from what its founders contemplated. But it remains a basic framework for international action that is as valid for 1956 as it was for 1945. It remains "a center," in the words of the charter, "for harmonizing the actions of nations" in the attainment of "common ends." The interests of nations are varied and rarely identical. But practically all nations share a real national interest in the existence of the U.N. In 11 years not a single nation has left the U.N. Its membership has, on the contrary, grown from 51 to 76, with more nations about to be added.

I have already mentioned the work of the U.N. in trying to find a solution to the Suez and Palestine problems. I might also mention that the General Assembly of the U.N. will at the session beginning on November 12 in New York discuss the final report of the International Law Commission on the regime of the high seas and the regime of territorial waters. And this, as you know, is a matter of great interest to our coastal States and brings us right back to the Pacific Northwest.

I have circled the globe—from here to the Far East, to Suez, through the Soviet Union, and back to Seattle. I have tried to give you a glimpse of the world's problems as we see them in Washington and of our efforts and hopes for their solution. Foreign relations place the responsibility on all of us to try to understand the problems and do what we can to meet them. I thank you for enabling me this evening to share this important duty with you of the Institute of International Affairs.

#### **Air Transport Discussions With Korea**

Press release 552 dated October 24

Arrangements have been made between the United States and the Republic of Korea for the commencement in Washington on October 29, 1956, of discussions concerning an air transport agreement between the two countries.

The United States delegation will be headed by Howard L. Parsons, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State. Minister Pyo Wook Han of the Embassy of Korea will be chief delegate of the Republic of Korea delegation. He will be assisted by Commercial Attaché Myung Won Shim and by Capt. Yong Wook Shinn, president of Korean National Airlines.

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## Foreign Aid Under the Microscope

by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>

My subject has to do with the foreign aid program of the United States. Foreign aid is a matter with which we, as a nation, have had some experience throughout our history. The founding fathers were deeply concerned with it—perhaps none of them more so than Benjamin Franklin.

I suppose it is really a Philadelphia custom to bring in the name of Benjamin Franklin. I speak with some authority, because in a talk about international trade in Philadelphia about a year and a half ago I could not resist telling a story in which Franklin, observing in London how three flies were revived by the sun's rays after being drowned in a bottle of wine, expressed a wish that he could be "immersed in a cask of Madeira wine, with a few friends," to be recalled to life a hundred years hence by the warm sunshine of his dear America.

But after all, it is a pleasant custom—talking about Franklin, that is—and very apt for speech-makers on *this* side of the Delaware too, for Franklin was no stranger to New Jersey. Indeed, New Jersey has her claim to that great patriot. He has left us a graphic account of how he trudged across this State at the age of 17, rain-soaked, tired, hungry, thirsty, almost penniless, on his way from Boston to Philadelphia and camped along your river bank, perhaps where some big factory now covers the landscape.

Later, one of his best-known humorous writings was his account of a "Witch Trial at Mount Holly," a place which I think must not be too far from here, judging by the signs on the Jersey Turnpike. Still later, he bought 300 acres near Burlington and performed some important agri-

cultural experiments there. He printed the paper money of the colony of New Jersey. In London he served as agent for the New Jersey Assembly.

However, the picture of Franklin that is important for our subject this evening does not specifically concern New Jersey, nor Philadelphia, nor Boston. It is the picture of Franklin in France during our Revolutionary War, a Franklin in his seventies, plainly dressed, bespectacled, perhaps the most renowned man in the world at that time—scientist, statesman, patriot, man of letters, printer, publisher, merchant, diplomat.

Having richly earned the right to retire, was this Titan satisfied to repair to his comfortable house in Philadelphia, resting on the honors that had been heaped upon him during his long and astonishing career, reminiscing and taking tender care of his gallstone and his gout? He was not. Having sailed past the guns of the British Navy on a dangerous voyage in which he faced an almost certain death on the gallows had he been captured, this indomitable old man was actively seeking help for his country in France. Surrounded by British spies and working amidst fearful aggravations and difficulties, he sought to obtain more and ever more French foreign aid for the newly established United States of America. Under pressure from the Continental Congress and from George Washington himself in the darkest months of the war, Franklin had to apply for loan after loan, even when it was personally humiliating to do so, and finally with the help of this French "mutual security program" our national independence was accomplished.

We also know that the Dutch and others were similarly approached at this time. But I have used this single episode as a forceful reminder that our country has known both ends of foreign

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the annual dinner of the Camden County Chamber of Commerce, Delaware Township, N. J., on Oct. 25 (press release 553 dated Oct. 24).

aid. We know how it feels to be the aider and how it feels to be the aided.

Let us now come to our own time and speak of 1956.

We have in this country an intercollegiate sport that may not be as spectacular as football but, in its own way, is just as vigorously contested. I refer to intercollegiate debating. Every year the intercollegiate authorities, through some sort of machinery with which I am unfamiliar, grind out a subject-of-the-year which is debated on platforms throughout the entire Nation. And this year the subject they have chosen is as follows: "RESOLVED: That the United States Should Discontinue Direct Economic Aid to Foreign Countries."

At the very time when our college students are earnestly contending with one another over whether to do away with economic assistance, some of their elders, men of much experience in world affairs, are just as earnestly contending that historical events require us to alter our aid programs in order to place even greater emphasis on the economic and less on the military.

Interest in foreign aid is by no means confined to these two viewpoints, but they do indicate the wide range of public concern. They also illustrate the gaps that exist among current views about the various foreign operations which we sometimes refer to as the mutual security program and sometimes simply as "foreign aid"—a term which is often misleading but which is so firmly rooted in the language that it is difficult to avoid.

#### **Reexamination of Program**

We shall make no effort to reconcile these widely separated viewpoints here tonight. This is not the place to try. But we can perhaps agree, as I think most Americans do agree, that our country has reached a period when it must ask itself the hardest questions imaginable and then make a serious, concerted, nonpartisan effort to agree on the answers. Such an effort has in fact commenced and will be going on for the next few months. This is a time of thought and reexamination, to me a stimulating time, when a great Nation puts a great program under the microscope for study.

Governmental evaluations of major programs, of course, go on continually, and changes are made as necessary. In the present situation, however,

something new has been added. Both the executive and legislative branches have commenced studies in which they have recruited the help of distinguished private citizens. Next year, when it comes time to decide what the mutual security program will be like in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, these broad studies will be useful to the President and the Congress. Even if they result in no fundamental alterations in the program, at least the country and the world will know better what the national objectives are and how the Government proposes to achieve them.

Tonight it is my purpose to report to you about the principal studies that have been set in motion and to give you some of the questions they are striving to answer. But first it might be useful to look backward a few years and remind ourselves of the main events that have brought us to the present juncture.

First, there was World War I. It changed the global balance of power. Europe, which for centuries had been the world power center, began a relative decline and contracted economic diseases which were to persist for decades. The United States emerged as a formidable world force. The Russian revolution cast a shadow on world affairs, small at first, but threatening.

One thing led to another until the civilized world was plunged into the nightmare that we call World War II. And, when the war finally ended, other nightmares followed—a hostile and aggressive Soviet Russia bent on fastening communism on the world; the monsters of "hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos" stalking through Western Europe; and the ominous mushroom of nuclear fission.

The United States, mightier than ever, its factories and farms prolific, its homeland physically undamaged though many thousands of families had lost members in battle, found itself faced with a world responsibility that has seldom come to any nation in history. You remember how America responded with a great bipartisan program, the Marshall plan. We can best recapture the electric atmosphere of those days by recalling the historic speech of Arthur Vandenberg in the Senate of March 1, 1948, when he said:

This legislation, Mr. President, seeks peace and stability for free men in a free world. It seeks them by economic rather than by military means. It proposes to help our friends to help themselves in the pursuit of sound and successful liberty in the democratic pattern. The quest can mean as much to us as it does to them. It aims to

preserve the victory against aggression and dictatorship which we thought we won in World War II. It strives to help stop World War III before it starts. It fights the economic chaos which would precipitate far-flung disintegration. It sustains western civilization. It means to take Western Europe completely off the American dole at the end of the adventure. It recognizes the grim truth—whether we like it or not—that American self-interest, national economy, and national security are inseverably linked with these objectives.

So ends the quotation from Senator Vandenberg. I was on the floor of the Senate when he made his famous address, and I clearly recall its insight, force, and effect. The Marshall plan performed its mission. And in those crowded years new developments altered the course of our foreign aid. One such development was the Communist invasion of Korea, which hastened a shift of emphasis away from economic aid and toward military assistance for the free world. Another was a remarkable new force in world affairs, the emergence of nationalism and economic aspirations in the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. As Europe rose again to her feet, our economic assistance shifted increasingly toward the so-called underdeveloped regions where populations are pressing governments to attain higher standards of living.

There is no question that the military and economic strength of the free world has increased and that the mutual security program has made—and is making—significant contributions to this increase. But the world situation does not stand still, and in the last year or two many interesting and complex problems have insistently demanded attention.

There is a growing competition in many countries between the heavy cost of a modern military establishment and the cost of economic growth. Many free-world governments are finding it difficult to maintain the kind of security force they need and also to finance and carry forward programs of economic development. The cessation of actual fighting on battlefronts in Asia has highlighted economic considerations and has shown the great and difficult choices that must be made, especially by the less-developed countries.

The problem has been intensified by a number of changes in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin. The fundamental objectives of the Communists unfortunately remain the same. One of the significant Soviet changes has been toward more flexi-

bility in international affairs. The Communists have begun extensive economic activities, including trade and aid, in those seething areas that I mentioned before—that is, the less-developed countries, especially in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia.

In an effort to deal with some of these problems, earlier this year the executive branch asked the Congress for greater flexibility in the administration of our mutual security program, and especially for authority to make long-term commitments. These requests were not fully granted. But they brought into sharper focus the fact that a certain amount of misunderstanding has developed over the last few years both in this country and abroad concerning the objectives of our programs.

#### **President's Citizen Advisers**

For these and other reasons the President last month enlisted a distinguished group of citizens to assist in a reexamination of our programs.<sup>2</sup> This group is called the President's Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program. They held their first meeting on September 27 and by now are deep in their assignment with the aim of making a progress report by December 1 and a final report by next March 1.

As coordinator of the citizen advisers, the President appointed Benjamin Fairless, former president and chairman of the board of the United States Steel Corporation. The six other advisers are:

Colgate W. Darden, Jr., president of the University of Virginia

Richard R. Deupree, chairman of the board of Proctor and Gamble Company

John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of America

Whitelaw Reid, chairman of the board of the New York *Herald Tribune*

Walter Bedell Smith, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, former Under Secretary of State, and now vice chairman of the American Machine and Foundry Company

Jesse W. Tapp, vice chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of America

The President gave these men a big order. He asked them to recommend concerning:

1. The purposes, scope, development, and operation of the overseas assistance programs in rela-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1956, p. 551.

tion to our own foreign policy and national interests;

2. The possible magnitude and duration of the programs in the light of our own economic capabilities;

3. The geographic distribution and composition of the programs; and

4. Methods of developing and administering programs which will most effectively and economically achieve the agreed purposes.

The President further requested the citizen advisers in studying those broad issues to give him their views on a number of specific questions. If I summarize these questions, we will have before us in capsule form some of the serious problems which our country now faces:

What should be the balance among military, economic, financial, and technical assistance? What are the best means of achieving flexibility and continuity? Under what terms and conditions should assistance be made available to foreign countries? What is the relationship between the disposal of surplus agricultural products and our mutual security operations? What is the role of private lending institutions and of private investment? What are the relative advantages of providing assistance on a bilateral or multilateral basis? What are the relative advantages of providing assistance on a loan or grant basis?

#### **Studies by the Congress**

Meanwhile, the Congress is already hard at work with microscopes of its own. Normally the committee hearings on the aid program do not begin until Congress has convened in January and is well along in its session. This year the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, the chairman of which is Representative James P. Richards of South Carolina, has already held a series of preliminary hearings. Witnesses from both inside and outside the Government have given their thoughtful views, and this committee and its staff plan a vast amount of further work before recommending action to the House some time next spring.

On the Senate side, a study is under way that is perhaps unique in the history of congressional inquiries. If I devote more time to describing the Senate project, it is because the Senate project has some unusual ramifications.

Last July 11, the Senate adopted a resolution—

Senate Resolution 285, to be exact—in which it created a Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program. This group consists of the full membership of the Foreign Relations Committee plus two leading members of the Appropriations Committee and two leading members of the Armed Services Committee.

This special committee, by the terms of the resolution, will "make exhaustive studies of the extent to which foreign assistance by the United States Government serves, can be made to serve, or does not serve, the national interest" and will direct its attention to a series of matters including the proper objectives of United States aid programs and the methods of accomplishing the objectives.

The committee is authorized to spend up to \$300,000 in probing into those matters. Senator Walter F. George, who is chairman of the committee but who is presently in Europe in connection with his new responsibilities as Special Representative and Personal Ambassador of the President, has appointed six Senators to serve as an executive committee during the adjournment of Congress. They are Senators Green, Russell, Fulbright, Bridges, your own Alexander Smith of New Jersey, and Knowland. Senator Fulbright is acting chairman of the executive committee.

Now, the most unusual feature of this study is that the committee has made commercial contracts with a number of outside institutions and private firms to look into various aspects and report their conclusions. Contracts have been signed with the following:

The Brookings Institution, to study the administrative aspects.

The Systems Analysis Corporation, to study certain aspects of military assistance.

The Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, likewise to study military assistance.

Louis J. Kroeger and Associates, to make a study of personnel for the assistance programs.

American Enterprise Association, Inc., to study the role of private enterprise in foreign assistance.

The National Planning Association, to study the impact of the programs on our domestic economy.

The Research Center for Economic Development and Cultural Change, of the University of Chicago, to study the processes of economic development.

The Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to study the objectives of economic assistance.

Stuart Rice Associates, to study the aid activities of other free nations.

The Council for Economic and Industry Research, Washington, D. C., to study foreign assistance activities

of the Communist bloc and their implications for the United States.

Jerome Jacobson Associates, to study the use of private contractors in the foreign aid programs.

The special committee is also engaging a number of experienced citizens to visit different parts of the world and make on-the-spot observations. Last week seven names were announced in this connection. One is Dr. Lewis Webster Jones, president of New Jersey's great Rutgers University, who is already in South Asia observing the programs in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan. The others are former Ambassador Norman Armour; former Ambassador James C. Dunn; William Randolph Hearst, Jr., the newspaper publisher; Dr. John A. Hannah, president of Michigan State University; James Minotto, former Government official; and Clement D. Johnston, chairman of the executive committee of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

So much for the Senate study. The studies which I have described, plus the regular policy planning of the executive agencies such as the Department of State, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Department of Defense, plus the advice of already-existing advisory committees, plus regular work of other congressional committees which I have not mentioned, plus the inevitable articles and editorials in hundreds of newspapers and magazines, plus the thoughtful discussions and ideas of many Americans in private life—perhaps I should add, plus the eloquence of the intercollegiate debaters—all add up to a pretty big microscope. But after all, the creature under observation is a pretty big specimen.

You may have been struck by the fact that the President's Citizen Advisers and the Senate special committee are not merely examining techniques and methods. They are also directed to consider why we have a mutual security program in the first place. They are asking: What are our purposes? What are we seeking? In other words, the examiners are directed to get down to fundamentals, and it is devoutly to be hoped that they will put fundamentals ahead of operating details.

#### **Principle Behind Foreign Aid**

This leads me, in closing my talk, to mention one of the most important fundamentals of all—the principle that when we help other countries

we do it in our own interest as well as theirs.

I know there are those who look upon foreign aid as a great give-away program. If I thought it to be such I would prefer to leave it to churches, missionaries, the private citizen, and institutions. But the broad concept underlying our loans, technical assistance, and grants to other countries is that such efforts are in our own enlightened self-interest because, to the extent they foster the national strength and independence of others, they strengthen the prospects for peace and freedom, and in the long run they promote our own continued economic growth.

No country should look upon aid from the United States as something to which it can lay claim as a matter of right, regardless of whether or not it is in the interest of the United States.

The so-called "recipient" country must of course accomplish the major part of the job through its own resources. The United States, in what it is able to do, is not seeking mere gratitude, but a healthier and more prosperous world to live in. The stronger our friends are, the more secure we are. As Senator Vandenberg said of the Marshall plan, "The quest can mean as much to us as it does to them."

It should not be surprising to anyone that the fundamental concept of our foreign aid is our own national interest. We all know that nations do not put the interests of other nations above their own. The French adored Benjamin Franklin and they were filled with romantic ardor by our Declaration of Independence, but the decisive reason why the French crown aided the United States was the cold conviction that it would be in the national interest of France to do so. This fact did not make the aid any less beneficial to the United States.

In like manner, the aid we provide to other countries is in our national interest, but this fact does not make the aid any less beneficial to the recipients.

The real question is not whether nations act in their self-interest. The real question is where a nation conceives its interest to be. The foreign operations of the United States are tangible evidence that this country conceives its long-range interests to coincide with the well-being and independence of other peoples.

Thus, what we call "foreign aid" is a matter of cooperation and partnership.

In spite of this simple fact, it is phenomenal

after all these years how many people still fail to grasp that principle.

Perhaps the term itself, "foreign aid," is partly to blame. It is short enough to fit into a headline, but it does not always fit the true facts. To some in the United States, the word "aid" suggests charity. To some in other parts of the world, the word "aid" has the unfortunate connotation of "donor and recipient," "rich uncle and poor relation," "successful—unsuccessful," "superior—inferior."

Besides, "foreign aid," being a convenient sort of handle, is used indiscriminately for activities which differ widely from one another, such as loans of various kinds, the teaching of technical skills, gifts of food to help people in emergencies, grants of equipment to foster economic development, and the transfer of military weapons for the common defense of the free world. Surely "aid" is hardly a precise term to describe each of these operations.

We are, however, saddled with the term "foreign aid" because it has become deeply implanted in the language. I do not suggest that we can cease using it altogether. But I do suggest that in the present period of national reexamination it will be well for all of us—our Government officials and our private citizens, our molders of public opinion, and our intercollegiate debaters—to keep in mind that "foreign aid," whatever you call it, carries with it the built-in concept that our programs aid others and aid us, too, because they and we have common interests.

## Visit of Rumanian Election Observers

Press release 554 dated October 24

The Department of State announced on October 20<sup>1</sup> that the U.S.S.R. and Rumania had accepted the invitation to send representatives to the United States to view at first hand the free electoral processes in this country. The Russian observers arrived on October 22.

Arrangements have been completed for the first half of the itinerary of the Rumanian observers. The second half of the itinerary is to be arranged after the observers have arrived in Washington to correspond with the request of the visitors and

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1956, p. 665.

as the developments of the political campaign indicate.

The Rumanian Government has informed the Government of the United States that its observers will be Constantin Paraschivescu-Balaceanu, member of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly and Rumanian member of The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration; Gheorghe Macovescu, journalist and Director General of Cinematography in the Ministry of Culture; and Ladislau Banyai, rector of the Bolyai University of Cluj and deputy of the Grand National Assembly.

The Department of State has made arrangements with the Governmental Affairs Institute to handle the details of the visit. Durrin Allin of the Institute and an interpreter will travel with the Rumanian observers during their stay in the United States. The Rumanian observers will arrive at Idlewild, N.Y., on October 24 and will fly to Washington the same day. In Washington they will receive a briefing at the Governmental Affairs Institute on American politics and elections. They will also visit the Republican National Headquarters and the Democratic National Committee.

On October 25 they will return to New York, where they will hear President Eisenhower speak at Madison Square Garden. On October 26, they will fly to San Francisco, Calif., and on October 27 they will hear the Democratic candidate for President, Adlai Stevenson, at an open-air rally in Washington Square.

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## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During October 1956

U.N. Committee To Review the Salary, Allowances and Benefits System: 2d Session.	New York . . . . .	September 1	11-October
3d ICAO Air Navigation Conference . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	September 23	18-October
ILO Tripartite Preparatory Technical Maritime Conference . . . . .	London . . . . .	September 2	19-October
FAO/WHO Regional Nutrition Committee for South and East Asia: 4th Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	September 2	25-October
UNESCO Regional Conference on Exchange of Publications . . . . .	Habana . . . . .	October 1-5	
Pan American Highway Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	Washington . . . . .	October 1-5	
South Pacific Commission: Technical Meeting on Pastures and Livestock.	Melbourne . . . . .	October 1-5	
ICEM Council: 5th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October 1-6	
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party on Dairy Products.	Rome . . . . .	October 1-7	
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 44th Annual Meeting.	Copenhagen . . . . .	October 1-9	
International Committee on Weights and Measures . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	October 1-10	
International Sugar Council: Statistical and Executive Committees.	Geneva . . . . .	October 2 (1 day)	
International Sugar Council: 9th Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October 2-3	
Hague Conference on International Private Law: 8th Session . . . . .	The Hague . . . . .	October 3-24	
U.N. ECE Working Party on Arbitration: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October 8-12	
International Tin Study Group and Management Committee: 8th Meeting.	London . . . . .	October 8-13	
FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East: 3d Session . . . . .	Bandung, Indonesia . . . . .	October 8-19	
International Conference To Consider the Status of Tangier . . . . .	Fedala, Morocco . . . . .	October 8-31*	
GATT Contracting Parties: Intersessional Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October 10 (1 day)	
UNICEF Committee on the Administrative Budget . . . . .	New York . . . . .	October 10-12	
ILO Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Workers: 4th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	October 15-27	
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade: 5th Session and East-West Trade Consultations.	Geneva . . . . .	October 15-27	
Conference on German External Assets . . . . .	Lisbon . . . . .	October 15-29	
WMO Commission for Maritime Meteorology: 2d Session . . . . .	Hamburg . . . . .	October 16-26*	
FAO World Eucalyptus Conference . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	October 17-29	
ICAO Panel on Future Requirements for Turbo-jet Aircraft: 1st Meeting.	Montreal . . . . .	October 17-31*	
U.N. ECE Timber Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October 22-25	
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: 11th Assembly.	Vienna . . . . .	October 22-27	

#### In Session as of October 31, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	November 28, 1955 -
U.N. Sugar Conference: 2d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October 4-
U.N. Special Committee on Question of Defining Aggression . . . . .	New York . . . . .	October 8-
GATT Contracting Parties: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October 11-
South Pacific Commission: 16th Session . . . . .	Nouméa, New Caledonia . . . . .	October 18-
Committee on Improvement of National Statistics: 4th Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	October 22-
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 2d Meeting.	New York . . . . .	October 22-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 24, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; CCIT, formerly Comité consultatif international télégraphique, now Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique (CCIT and CCIF combined); ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; CCIF, Comité consultatif international téléphonique; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union.

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### In Session as of October 31, 1956—Continued

UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee . . . . .  
 FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 1st Meeting of Consultative Subcommittee on Economic Aspects of Rice.  
 U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Trade: 2d Session . . . . .  
 UNESCO Executive Board: 45th Session . . . . .

New York . . . . . October 22-  
 Rome . . . . . October 29-  
 Tokyo . . . . . October 29-  
 New Delhi . . . . . October 31-

### Scheduled November 1, 1956—January 31, 1957

Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Preliminary Working Group.  
 FAO International Rice Commission: *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Storage and Processing of Rice.  
 U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: Working Party on Rural Electrification.  
 UNESCO General Conference: 9th Session . . . . .  
 ICAO Special Meeting on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Facilities.  
 7th International Grassland Congress . . . . .  
 U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee . . . . .  
 FAO Cocoa Study Group: 1st Meeting . . . . .  
 FAO International Rice Commission: 5th Session . . . . .  
 International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 4th Meeting . . . . .  
 U.N. General Assembly: 11th Session . . . . .  
 U.N. ECE Timber Committee: Joint FAO/ECE Working Party on Forest and Forest Products Statistics.  
 ICAO Special Limited Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting.  
 Caribbean Commission: Conference on Town and Country Development Planning.  
 Inter-Parliamentary Union: 45th Conference . . . . .  
 Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Officials Meeting.  
 ICAO Panel on Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting Equipment at Aerodromes.  
 FAO Regional Conference for Latin America: 4th Session . . . . .  
 U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on Censuses of Population and Housing.  
 U.N. ECLA Trade Committee . . . . .  
 ILO Governing Body: 133d Session . . . . .  
 ITU International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIT): Preliminary Study Group.  
 Customs Cooperation Council: 9th Session . . . . .  
 Inter-American Technical Meeting on Housing and Planning . . . . .  
 U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 13th Session and Working Parties . . . . .  
 Inter-American Travel Congresses: Permanent Executive Committee.  
 U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 4th Session.  
 ITU International Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIF): 18th Plenary Assembly (Final Meeting).  
 U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 8th Meeting . . . . .  
 U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties . . . . .  
 Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Ministerial Meeting.  
 UNESCO Middle East Conference on Vocational and Technical Education (with FAO and ILO).  
 International Wheat Council: 21st Session . . . . .  
 UNESCO Executive Board: 46th Session . . . . .  
 American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Semiannual Meeting of Directing Council.  
 ITU International Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCIT): 8th Plenary Assembly (Final Meeting).  
 Caribbean Commission: 23d Meeting . . . . .  
 Symposium on Tropical Cyclones . . . . .  
 U.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .  
 U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee . . . . .  
 U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 5th Session of Working Party on Railway Track Sleepers.  
 ITU International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIT): Plenary Assembly of New CCIT (former CCIT and CCIF combined).  
 NATO Council: Ministerial Session . . . . .

Wellington, New Zealand . . . . . November 5-  
 Calcutta . . . . . November 5-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 5-  
 New Delhi . . . . . November 5-  
 Montreal . . . . . November 6-  
 Palmerston, New Zealand . . . . . November 6-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 8-  
 Brussels . . . . . November 12-  
 Calcutta . . . . . November 12-  
 Seattle . . . . . November 12-  
 New York . . . . . November 12-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 12-  
 Guatemala City . . . . . November 13-  
 Trinidad . . . . . November 14-  
 Bangkok . . . . . November 15-  
 Wellington, New Zealand . . . . . November 19-  
 Montreal . . . . . November 19-  
 Santiago . . . . . November 19-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 19-  
 Santiago . . . . . November 19-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 20-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 22-  
 Brussels . . . . . November 26-  
 Bogotá . . . . . November 26-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 26-  
 Lima . . . . . November 28-  
 Geneva . . . . . November 28-  
 Geneva . . . . . December 3-  
 Geneva . . . . . December 3-  
 Geneva . . . . . December 4-  
 Cairo . . . . . December 4-  
 London . . . . . December 4\*-  
 New Delhi . . . . . December 6-  
 Montevideo . . . . . December 8-  
 Geneva . . . . . December 8-  
 Barbados, British West Indies . . . . . December 10-  
 Brisbane, Australia . . . . . December 10-  
 Geneva . . . . . December 10-  
 Geneva . . . . . December 10-  
 Bangkok . . . . . December 13-  
 Geneva . . . . . December 15-  
 Paris . . . . . December

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled November 1, 1956—January 31, 1957—Continued

U.N. Economic and Social Council: Resumed 22d Session . . . .	New York . . . . .	December
U.N. ECOSOC Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York . . . . .	January 3-
U.N. ECOSOC Transport and Communications Commission: 8th Session.	New York . . . . .	January 7-
WMO Working Group on Meteorological Communications of Regional Association I (Africa): 3d Session.	Las Palmas, Canary Islands.	January 8-
International Commission for the Celebration of the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Hamilton.	(undetermined) . . . . .	January 11-
WMO Commission on Climatology: 2d Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	January 14-
WMO Regional Association I (Africa): 2d Session . . . . .	Las Palmas, Canary Islands.	January 21-
19th International Red Cross Conference	New Delhi . . . . .	January 21-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee: Airmail Subcommittee .	Luxor, Egypt . . . . .	January 29-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party on Coconut.	Ceylon* . . . . .	January *
International Congress of National Libraries (with UNESCO) .	Habana . . . . .	January
Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives . . . .	Washington . . . . .	January or February.
U.N. Refugee Fund: 4th Session of Executive Committee . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	January
U.N. Refugee Fund Standing Program Subcommittee: 4th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	January

## The Question of Defining Aggression

*Statement by William Sanders<sup>1</sup>*

The present Committee of government representatives has met pursuant to the General Assembly resolution of December 4, 1954, which created it [895 (IX)]. By its resolution, the Assembly has requested that the Committee, having regard to the ideas expressed and drafts submitted at the ninth session of the Assembly, present to the eleventh session this year a detailed report followed by a draft definition of aggression. The General Assembly's resolution, in its preamble, recites the necessity of coordinating the views expressed by members of the United Nations on this problem.

The record of the repeated and repetitious discussions of this matter within the United Nations gives evidence, it seems to me, of a growing awareness of the difficulties and complexities of the problem. The discussions have underscored the point that the supposed advantages of a definition of aggression are not as self-evident or as easily obtainable as had been supposed and that, more fundamentally, a definition could do more damage than good. Apart from the technical problems, which in themselves present unresolved difficulties of a far-reaching character, there has been a deepening cleavage on the problems of substance.

In issue is the validity of the starting premise that a definition would strengthen the procedures and machinery for the maintenance of peace. This premise is countered by the view that a definition

<sup>1</sup> Made on Oct. 17 in the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Mr. Sanders is the U.S. representative on the Committee, which is meeting at U.N. Headquarters. Members of the Committee, named in a resolution passed by the General Assembly in 1954, are: China, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, France, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Syria, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., and Yugoslavia.

At the opening meeting on Oct. 8, Mr. Sanders made the following statement: "The Government of the United States has expressed its opposition to the seating of the representatives of the Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations on numerous occasions. Our reasons for this position, therefore, need not be repeated here. Since this Committee is elected by the General Assembly and lacks the competence to determine its own composition, we had hoped there would be no need to have further discussion of this subject here. However, since the matter has been raised, the United States would like to place on the record its continued opposition to the seating of the representatives of the Chinese Communist regime and its support for the continued seating of the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China in all United Nations and specialized agency bodies."

would encourage dangerous illusions that the instrumentalities of peace would thereby be strengthened, and more, that in practice a definition would bring about results contrary to the objective pursued. One aspect of this fundamental issue is posed in terms of the opposing views concerning whether a definition would facilitate and expedite action by the United Nations organs in the event of aggression. It is argued that a definition of aggression would guarantee or promote agreement in advance of the exact occasion for automatic action by the United Nations; the reply is made that a definition would, on the contrary, confuse and restrict future discussion and action on the part of the appropriate organs. Another aspect of the basic problem relates to the deterrent effects of a definition, that is, whether it would or would not inhibit a potential aggressor. The proponents of definition argue firmly that it would have such an effect; the opponents claim equally firmly that a definition would instead become a vehicle for propaganda and "a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the guilty."

These issues and differences are among the many that have prevented agreement in the General Assembly. They explain why this Committee was established.

With this situation before us we are not expected, I am sure, simply to report a result which expresses the lowest possible denominator of agreement. I said at our first meeting that ours is not a paper operation. By this I meant that we are not expected, surely, to submit as the end product of our labors the statistical distillation of a comparative study of ideas, views, and drafts. Neither the creation of this Committee by the General Assembly nor acceptance of membership in it by our governments carried any implication that the basic issues of substance and method had somehow been compromised or resolved. The General Assembly cannot be said to have finally settled, in adopting a resolution creating a committee to study the problem, a basic issue of principle involved in the problem. The Committee is therefore not limited to a task of working out the details of decisions already taken on the principal substantive issues. It must itself consider these issues, and it is requested to report on them in detail and to follow its report with a draft definition. The performance of this Committee, it would seem, is not to be judged simply on whether or not it succeeds in

attaching a draft definition to its report. In such an important matter, the Assembly will look to the substance of the report, the thoroughness with which all problems have been considered, and the potentialities for good or bad inherent in any definition that might be appended. In short, we are neither compelled nor expected to avoid the problems inherent in the definition of aggression by ignoring them.

The members of the Committee are representatives of governments, not persons serving in an individual or expert capacity. As such they will and must continue to represent the views of their governments. This does not argue for inflexibility of positions but for freedom to explore and debate the matter in its entirety.

In this spirit and with this approach in mind, I should like with your permission, Mr. Chairman [Enrique de Marchena, Dominican Republic], to review briefly the basic problems as my delegation sees them.

Our first task, I suggest, is to explore and, if possible, to agree upon the criteria or tests which any definition must meet if it is to forward the ends which this second Special Committee has been created to serve. Without such exploration and without a wide area of solid agreement on the criteria to be used, we will in the end do a disservice to the United Nations and to the cause of peace.

#### **Criteria To Guide the Task**

The first, or basic, criterion would appear to be almost self-evident and one on which agreement should be unanimous. It follows from a realization that this problem has been pursued because people in this world want peace and justice. To meet this want, we must understand, and should be prepared to state, whether and how a definition of aggression, if recommended by this Committee and embodied in a resolution of the General Assembly, would help in maintaining and restoring peace.

To apply this basic criterion it is necessary to test any definition in light of the occasions when it is most likely to be invoked in aid of or in opposition to efforts to keep and to restore the peace. These are:

1. Consideration of action through United Nations organs;

2. Consideration of action under arrangements for collective security or in individual self-defense.

Proponents of definitions have stated their supposed good effects for international peace and security in a variety of ways. A synthesis is found in the words of M. Politis in introducing his proposal at the League of Nations Conference for Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in 1933:

Its effect and its practical advantage would be that it warned States of the acts they must not commit if they did not wish to run the risk of being declared aggressors. Thanks to it, public opinion would be able, when a grave incident occurred in international relations, to form a judgment as to which State was responsible. Lastly, and above all, it would facilitate its task, it would be less tempted to incur the danger of excusing, on political grounds, the act of aggression which it was called upon to judge.

A contrary view on the utility of a definition in the United Nations Charter was expressed by M. Paul-Boncour in the report of Committee III/3 at San Francisco in 1945:

... it . . . became clear to a majority of the Committee that a preliminary definition of aggression went beyond the possibilities of this Conference and the purpose of the Charter. The progress of the technique of modern warfare renders very difficult the definition of all cases of aggression. It may be noted that, the list of such cases being necessarily incomplete, the Council would have a tendency to consider of less importance the acts not mentioned therein; these omissions would encourage the aggressor to distort the definition or might delay action by the Council. Furthermore, in the other cases listed, automatic action by the Council might bring about a premature application of enforcement measures.

The Committee therefore decided to adhere to the text drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks and to leave to the Council the entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

Both of these statements refer to the effect of a definition on the work of international organs, the action of individual states, and the development of informed public opinion, from the point of view of securing international peace. This suggests that our basic criterion presents at least two important questions:

1. How will a proposed definition affect the work of United Nations organs?

2. How will it influence the decisions of individual states, acting collectively or individually?

Each of these questions in turn involves two additional inquiries:

1. How will it affect a potential aggressor? and,

2. How will a proposed definition affect public opinion?

**Test of Use by United Nations Organs**

The charter envisages three types of situations that may serve as the basis of Security Council action under chapter VII. Under chapter VII the Council may act to deal with a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. As a matter of charter law, the powers and responsibilities of its organs are the same with respect to each of these situations.

It is also to be noted that the charter imposes on the Security Council the necessity of making a considered judgment in selecting the means to keep the peace. By the same token it excludes the possibility of so-called automatic sanctions. Under the League of Nations, there was a considerable effort to create a system of automatic sanctions. Under such a system a predetermined formula or definition would have played an essential role. The charter rejects such an approach. Under the charter, then, it does not matter under which finding the United Nations considers peace and justice impaired—whether by a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. In each case, the Security Council is expected to maintain or restore international peace and security, and it is empowered to and should use whatever means—from conciliation to force—may be best to achieve this end. Since the problem is how best to act, given facts warranting any of the three findings, a definition of one of them, no definition of the other two, and a great debate on which is the right finding, might well be irrelevant and a disservice to peace, because a diversionary and wasted effort.

Granted, then, that any given definition judged by this criterion might seem useless, might it not assist in analyzing the facts, even though no final determination were made that aggression had occurred? In this connection, any definition considered should be very closely examined for its consistency with the charter and the extent to which it will require analysis of the attitude and conduct of states in relation to the successive stages of Security Council or General Assembly consideration of the matter. In an area where facts are often extremely difficult to marshal quickly and where the parties put forward conflicting versions

of them, it must constantly be asked: How is this or that definition likely to affect this problem, taking into account the fact that use of force can and must be regarded as lawful or unlawful only with full regard to all relevant provisions of the charter and decisions, actions, and requests of the competent United Nations organs?

Reference has been made to the problem of marshaling the facts. The difficulty is heightened by the covert forms which acts of aggression may and often do assume and the tendency of aggressors to conceal their guilt by charges against their victims. Here then is another test for any definition: How will it affect the task of a United Nations organ that must seek out the facts? Will it make a difficult task the more difficult?

For the sake of brevity, I shall not here dwell on another important aspect of this same topic; it has been fully debated in the past. It is the point that a definition will not facilitate but rather hinder expeditious actions by organs of the United Nations by transferring the focus of attention from the real problem of ascertaining the facts to the artificial and formal one of determining whether the facts fit the definition.

#### **Test of Use in the Context of Collective or Individual Self-Defense**

Turning now to the use of a definition in the context of collective or individual self-defense, it has been suggested that we approach the problem before the Committee by defining armed attack as this term is used in article 51 of the charter, that is, by defining when a state may resort to armed force in self-defense. While this suggestion was advanced as one incorporating a narrow and restrictive concept, it was nevertheless objected to on the ground that such a definition would facilitate preventive war. It seems at least premature to conclude that a definition which has not been put before us would encourage preventive war. The suggestion and rejoinder do, however, indicate two reasonable tests of a definition, whether of aggression or of armed attack—or, for that matter, of self-defense—which, although easy to state, may tax our wisdom to apply. These tests are:

1. Could the definition prejudice a legitimate resort to self-defense as recognized under article 51?
2. Might it discourage reference of a dangerous

situation to the competent organs of the United Nations even where circumstances might clearly permit such a reference?

We have seen that, in the context of chapter VII, aggression has no consequences distinguishing it from a threat to the peace or breach of the peace. All of us are aware of the fact that self-defense is a remedy of last resort in a world system that seeks to eliminate resort to force and to substitute peaceful methods of settlement.

It will be observed that in considering the concept of aggression in relation to article 51 of the charter we are compelled to recognize a variety of possible relationships between that concept and the concepts of armed attack and of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." Whatever definition we might be considering will have to be thought of in terms of its effect on the relationship we may consider exists among the three concepts. Whatever the precise nature of that relationship, there would probably be general agreement that changes in attitude toward one concept will not be without effect on the other two.

It is in this light that the two tests above suggested seem particularly important. A definition of any one of the three concepts which in any way impaired the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 would, of course, be contrary to the intent of the charter and, by handicapping the member state which might be the object of an armed attack, might, in fact, be an incentive to aggression.

Events surrounding the outbreak of armed conflict are frequently complex and seldom fully revealed to the world or even to the governments most concerned at the time. A definition must, therefore, be most carefully examined to determine whether it is calculated to lead governments to ascertain and to take full account of all the relevant facts.

In this connection it should be borne in mind that a definition that *appears to any member* to characterize a particular act as an act of aggression or as armed attack may encourage resort to force without awaiting Security Council or General Assembly consideration. These organs are by the law required to proceed through deliberative and to some degree impartial—at least multi-partial—process to a reasoned choice of method; but an individual member, with a necessarily partial viewpoint, is generally under strong pressures

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to take the strongest possible steps. It is well known that both sides to a serious controversy are usually firmly convinced of their version of the facts and the justice of their case. The existence of a definition is not likely to affect this truth one way or another. What it may do, however, is to diminish the pressures to seek initial United Nations consideration and increase the pressures to resort to force in self-defense, leaving eventual United Nations consideration to the second stage of a report in the Security Council, in conformity with article 51. The definition could do this by supplying a purportedly exact and agreed criterion or set of criteria which, it may be believed, was intended to require or license resort to collective force against the other side and clearly to authorize it in self-defense.

I have referred at some length to the problems posed by article 51 because they reproduce and exemplify, in terms of a recent discussion in the present Committee, the dilemmas which confront us in all aspects of the task of defining aggression.

#### **Utility in Context of a Code of Offenses**

We should also consider the basic criterion in the light of the proposed code of offenses. In this context, the main impetus for such a definition is clearly to provide against the need for formalizing legal rules for individual punishment *after* the crimes were committed. This is a thoroughly civilized and creditable aim. The answer is not, however, now to formulate a new definition of aggression for a new code. We already have an agreed code in the charter of the United Nations. It provides for peaceful procedures and calls for support of them. It outlaws resort to force except in conformity with its provisions. If the day should come when an international criminal jurisdiction appeared wise, timely, and feasible, the law to be enforced would necessarily be the law of the United Nations Charter. While it is theoretically true that many of its provisions could be elaborated by amendment, we know perfectly well that such elaborations are not likely in the immediate future. In any event, if an international criminal jurisdiction existed today and if a member state moved against another state as the North Koreans did against Korea, it is difficult to see how the legal rights and duties of the disputants could better have been clarified than as occurred in the case of

Korea and as recorded in successive resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly, acting under and in application of the provisions of the governing law—the charter.

#### **Some General Tests**

In whatever context it is envisaged, a definition should be measured by certain general tests.

First, it should not create more definitional problems than it purports to solve. To define aggression as the first unprovoked attack, for instance, leaves one with the task of defining "first," "unprovoked," and "attack." This is not easy to agree about, as anyone who has read the history of the problem will recognize.

Second, it should not, by specifying particular acts of aggression, allow others to appear to be sanctioned, or at least considered less important.

Finally, definitions should be realistically appraised in the light of history. A very familiar and cogent example is the analysis of the proposals of the Soviet Union in the perspective of history.

The examples of aggression appearing in the Act of Chapultepec of 1945 and the Rio Treaty of 1947 must be understood as based upon a very substantial area of mutual trust and understanding, and thus as an outcome of the historical development of inter-American hemispheric solidarity and defense. Under the charter of the United Nations there is no such restricted geographical and cultural focus.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, in the view of my delegation, there are many criteria or tests which should be met before this Special Committee could commend a definition of aggression to the General Assembly with assurance that its definition would in no way diminish the ability, moral force, and determination of the United Nations to maintain peace.

#### **U.S. Alternate Representative on OAS Council**

President Eisenhower on October 24 appointed William L. Krieg, Deputy Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State, to be Alternate Representative of the United States on the Council of the Organization of American States.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Signing of Tax Convention With Austria

#### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 555 dated October 25

On October 25, Secretary Dulles and Dr. Karl Gruber, Austrian Ambassador in Washington, signed a convention between the United States and Austria for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.

The convention is substantially similar to income-tax conventions now in force between the United States and numerous other countries, containing provisions for reciprocal exemptions or credits with respect to taxation of various types of income and provisions relating to administrative cooperation.

The convention applies, so far as United States taxes are concerned, only to the Federal income taxes. It does not apply to the imposition or collection of taxes by the several States, the District of Columbia, or the territories or possessions of the United States, except that it contains a broad national-treatment provision in regard to taxation similar to a provision customarily found in treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation.

It is provided in the convention that it shall be effective on and after January 1 of the calendar year in which the exchange of instruments of ratification takes place. It will be necessary to transmit the convention to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

#### REMARKS BY SECRETARY DULLES AND AMBASSADOR GRUBER

Press release 558 dated October 25

*Following are the texts of the remarks of Secretary Dulles and the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Karl Gruber, at the signing of a convention between the United States and Austria on the avoidance of double taxation.*

#### Secretary Dulles

Mr. Ambassador, I am happy to join with you in signing this convention on the avoidance of double taxation on income. The treaty to which we have just put our names will be of especial significance to Austrian citizens living in the United States and American citizens living in Austria. It will, I hope, stimulate the flow of private investment and promote the growing trade between our two countries.

In a larger sense, today marks the first anniversary of the date on which your country was finally freed from the presence of foreign troops after 17 years. The restoration of Austrian independence was one of the objectives for which the United States fought in the Second World War. In the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, with the French Committee for National Liberation adhering later, declared that they wished "to see reestablished a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace."

The reestablishment of a free and independent Austria remained one of the principal objectives of American foreign policy in the ensuing decade. In his address of April 16, 1953, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, President Eisenhower referred to the persistent efforts of the United States to conclude the Austrian treaty and listed the conclusion of the treaty as one of the specific steps to be taken to promote justice and peace throughout the world.<sup>1</sup>

The long negotiations to obtain an Austrian State Treaty, with which I myself was first associated in 1947 as an adviser to Secretary of State Marshall, finally culminated in the treaty that came into effect last year.<sup>2</sup> Throughout these protracted negotiations, your countrymen displayed remarkable patience and steadfast loyalty to the ideals of freedom despite the frustrations of a long occupation. Without the courage of the Austrian people, the consummation of the treaty would have been impossible.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 509.

<sup>2</sup> For text of treaty, see *ibid.*, June 6, 1955, p. 916.

Today there are "those neighboring states" who await the fulfillment of the promise of political and economic security which was made in Moscow in 1943. The political and economic achievements of your Government cannot but be an inspiration to them.

On the eve of your Flag Day, which commemorates the reestablishment of Austrian independence, I take great pleasure in wishing the people of your country continued peace and prosperity.

#### Ambassador Gruber

Mr. Secretary, I am very pleased that we have been able to sign another agreement, which will still further strengthen the existing friendly relations between Austria and the United States. This Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income will certainly help to avoid friction and complications in an important field of our relations.

I am happy that the relations between our two countries are traditionally excellent and are based firmly on mutual friendship and understanding. In the time of Austria's greatest need the United States of America gave us great relief, a relief which saved our children and, later, helped us to reconstruct Austria's industries.

In addition to the material aid which Austria received from the United States since the end of the World War hostilities, you gave us your assistance in the continual struggle for the conclusion of a reasonable treaty in order to restore a free and independent Austria.

You, personally, Mr. Secretary, have worked with relentless zeal for the reestablishment of a free Austria. Even though we finally had to enter a compromise to conclude this treaty, we think this treaty has been a good thing and has helped to strengthen the principle of free government in a very important part of Europe.

Since you, Mr. Secretary, had to present the State Treaty to the American Senate for ratification, I think it is appropriate for me to say now that this last year has already justified the judgment expressed at that time.

We know that for a few years to come Austria will still have some difficult times to overcome, as we must fulfill the economic clauses of the treaty mentioned above. But we will work hard toward

that end, and I hope that, as in the past, we can count on your friendly understanding for our various problems.

On the occasion of signing this agreement, which again emphasizes the mutual understanding between our two countries, I am therefore very happy to express the gratitude of the Austrian people to your Government and to the American people.

### Tax Conventions With Italy Enter Into Force

Press release 559 dated October 26

On October 26, 1956, the two tax conventions between the United States and the Italian Republic signed at Washington on March 30, 1955,<sup>1</sup> were brought into force by the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange took place in Rome.

The convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income is effective as of January 1, 1956.

The convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances is applicable to estates or inheritances in the case of persons dying on or after October 26, 1956.

The provisions of the conventions with Italy follow in general the pattern of tax conventions in force between the United States and numerous other countries. The conventions are designed, in the one case, to remove an undesirable impediment to international trade and economic development by eliminating as far as possible double taxation on the same income and, in the other case, to eliminate double taxation in connection with the settlement in one country of estates in which nationals of the other country have interests.

In the United States, the conventions apply only with respect to United States, that is, Federal taxes. They do not apply to the imposition of taxes by the several States, the District of Columbia, or the territories or possessions of the United States. The Italian taxes to which the conventions apply are taxes imposed by the national government. They do not apply to taxes imposed by provinces or municipalities.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN OF APR. 11, 1955, p. 614.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, for a period of 90 days, beginning October 26, 1956, by States members of the United Nations or the specialized agencies thereof. Will enter into force when 18 States have deposited ratifications, provided 3 of the following States are included: Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States.

*Signatures:* Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vatican City, Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, October 26, 1956.

#### Postal Services

Convention of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, final protocol, and regulations of execution. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956. TIAS 3653.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, October 19, 1956. Agreement relative to parcel post, final protocol, and regulations of execution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956. TIAS 3654.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, October 19, 1956. Agreement relative to money orders and final protocol of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956. TIAS 3655.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, October 19, 1956.

#### Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1956. Open for signature at Washington through May 18, 1956.

*Acceptance deposited:* El Salvador, October 23, 1956.

### BILATERAL

#### Austria

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington October 25, 1956. Enters into force on the date of exchange of ratifications.

#### Colombia

Air transport agreement. Signed at Bogotá October 24, 1956. Enters into force provisionally January 1, 1957, and becomes definitive upon receipt by the United States of notification of ratification by Colombia.

#### Costa Rica

Third-party amateur radio agreement. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Washington August 13 and October 19, 1956.

*Entered into force:* October 19, 1956.

#### India

Agreement providing for emergency flood relief assistance. Effectuated by exchange of notes at New Delhi September 27, 1956.

*Entered into force:* September 27, 1956.

#### Italy

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington March 30, 1955.

*Ratifications exchanged:* October 26, 1956.

*Entered into force:* October 26, 1956.

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances. Signed at Washington March 30, 1955.

*Ratifications exchanged:* October 26, 1956.

*Entered into force:* October 26, 1956.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

#### Designations

Henry P. Leverich as Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, effective October 7.

## PUBLICATIONS

#### Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

**Transfer of German Archives.** TIAS 3613. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of letters—Signed at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg March 14 and April 18, 1956. Entered into force April 18, 1956.

**Passport Visas.** TIAS 3614. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Israel. Exchange of letters—Signed at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv February 14 and 28 and March 2, 1955. Entered into force March 2, 1955.

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†549	10/22	Ageton: "Good Partnership in Paraguay."
†550	10/23	Wilcox: "The U.N. in an Interdependent World."
551	10/23	Murphy: "A Review of U.S. Foreign Policy."
552	10/24	U.S.-Korean discussions on air transport agreement.
553	10/24	Kalijarvi: "Foreign Aid Under the Microscope."
554	10/24	Visit of Rumanian election observers.
555	10/25	Tax convention with Austria.
†556	10/25	Air transport agreement with Colombia.
†557	10/25	Wadsworth appointed to IAEA Preparatory Commission.
558	10/25	Dulles, Gruber: signing of tax convention with Austria.
559	10/26	Entry into force of U.S.-Italian tax conventions.
560	10/27	Dulles: "The Task of Waging Peace."
561	10/27	U.S. recognition of Honduran Government.
562	10/28	Dulles: suffering of Hungarian people.
563	10/28	Increased tensions in Middle East.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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